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"Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on
Section 5 Powers
Evan H. Caminker*
With the narrowing of Congress' Article I power to regulate interstate
commerce and to authorize private suits against states, Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with an increasingly important
alternative source of power to regulate and police state conduct. However, in
City of Boerne v. Flores and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has tightened
the doctrinal test for prophylactic legislation based on Section Five. The Court
has clarified Section Five's legitimate ends by holding that Congress may enforce
Fourteenth Amendment rights only as they are defined by the federal judiciary,
and the Court has constrained Section Five's permissible means by holding that
Section Five measures must be "congruent and proportional" to a legitimate end
thus defined
This article argues that the means-ends test for Section Five legislation
should be the same as the conventional "rational relationship" test established
by McCulloch v. Maryland, not the "congruence and proportionality" test that
the Court has recently adopted. The textual language and the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment support this argument, while neither separation of
powers nor federalism principles persuasively justify the Court's contrary
position. Finally, this article speculates about the significance of Section Five's
tightened means-ends scrutiny for other sources of congressional power.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; B.A., UCLA 1983; J.D.,
Yale 1986. I wrote this article while on leave as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice. The views expressed herein
are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of Legal Counsel or
Department of Justice. I wish to thank Akhil Amar, Vicki Jackson, Marty Lederman, Trevor
Morrison, and Michael Rosman for instructive comments on an earlier draft, as well as the
symposium's many participants for enlightening conversations about federalism and the
Constitution.
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Over the past decade, Congress' Section 5 power to enforce the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment has taken center stage in the unfolding drama of
Our (New) Federalism.' For the first time in seven decades, the Supreme Court
has begun to narrow the scope of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce. While not long ago it was plausible to describe Congress'
Commerce Clause power as virtually plenary, the Court has twice now
invalidated statutes as exceeding the proper boundaries of this Article I
authority. In United States v. Lopez2 the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990,3 and in United States v. Morrison4 the Court invalidated a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that provided a federal
civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence.5 In both cases, the
Court emphasized that the federal statutes purported to regulate activities not
economic in nature6 without any jurisdictional limitation linking particular
instances of such activity to interstate commerce,7 in a manner that would
trench upon a realm of "traditional state concern," 8 thereby obliterating the
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." 9 While it
remains unclear just how significant a reduction in the scope of Congress'
Commerce Clause power these recent precedents portend, it surely places
greater pressure on Section 5 as a potential alternative source of congressional
power for at least some regulations threatened by this Commerce Clause
retrenchment.
Also within the past decade, the Supreme Court has severely restricted an
1. The relevant provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment provide as follows:
Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws....
Section 5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922q (1994).
4. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
6. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 560; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
7. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-13.
8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599; see also Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675, 683-84
(2001) (justifying narrow construction of Clean Water Act's application to "navigable
waters" partly on desire to avoid difficult question concerning scope of Commerce Clause
authority); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 856-58 (2000) (justifying narrow
contruction of arson statute partly on desire to avoid difficult constitutional question of
whether congressional regulation of private residential arson lies beyond Commerce Clause
power).
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important enforcement mechanism through which Congress could police state
compliance with federal law. Since Hans v. Louisiana,0 the Court has
understood the principles underlying the Eleventh Amendment" as immunizing
states from suits to which they did not consent seeking damages or other
retrospective relief brought by private persons to enforce federal law.' 2 Within
the past three decades, the Court began to consider the extent to which this
principle of state sovereign immunity is subject to abrogation by Congress. In
1976, the Court held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 3 that Congress may abrogate state
sovereign immunity through measures enacted pursuant to Congress' Section 5
authority to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against states.
In 1989, the Court extended the scope of this abrogation power in Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co.,14 where it held that if Congress may regulate the conduct of
states pursuant to its Commerce Clause power,5 then Congress may also
enforce such regulations by authorizing private individuals aggrieved by states
to sue them directly in federal court to recover monetary damages, the
background immunity principle notwithstanding. 16 But this broadened view of
Congress' abrogation authority did not last a decade. In 1996, the Court
overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,17 holding that Congress
10. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
11. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
12. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (citations omitted):
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not
so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms." That
presupposition... has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal
system; and second, that "'[lt is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent.'
This principle does not protect states from suits by individuals seeking prospective
relief, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) and its progeny. Nor does it apply to
Supreme Court review of individual suits seeking retrospective relief against states that were
brought originally in state court. See McKesson Corp. v. Florida Div. of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26-31 (1990).
The Court has also held that states waived, in the original constitutional plan, any
erstwhile sovereign immunity from suits brought either by the United States, see, for
example, United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892), or by a sister state, see, for example,
South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904). But the Court rejected a similar
waiver argument for suits brought either by an Indian tribe, see Blatchford v. Native Vill. of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), or by a foreign state, see Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313
(1934). For a consideration of the rationales for such distinctions, see Evan H. Caminker,
State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 101-11 (1999).
13. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
14. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44,45 (1996).
15. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985), which
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), made clear that Congress
may in certain circumstances directly regulate state as well as private conduct.
16. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-23.
17. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court pursuant to its
Commerce Clause authority. Then three years later in Alden v. Maine,18 the
Court extended Seminole Tribe by holding that Congress cannot use such
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in state court either. At the
same time, however, both Seminole Tribe and Alden specifically reaffirmed
Bitzer's acknowledgment of a Section 5 abrogation power.9 Thus, at the turn
of the new century, Congress may enforce federal law by subjecting
unconsenting states to private suits for damages pursuant to its Section 5
powers, but not pursuant to its Article I powers.20 This doctrinal distinction
clearly puts additional pressure on Congress to justify many of its federal
statutes as being valid exercises of the Section 5 enforcement power rather than
exercises of Article I authority.
Given Section 5's new centrality to federalism policy and law, particularly
with respect to abrogating state sovereign immunity, it is unsurprising that
more of the Supreme Court's major federalism cases in the last decade involved
Section 5 than any other font of federal power.2' And it is equally unsurprising
that the Court has been inhospitable to expansive exercises of congressional
authority. In the past four years, the Court both clarified and modified the
longstanding doctrinal test governing whether legislation can be defended as
predicated on Section 5, beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores 2 Boerne
establishes two major interpretive principles, the first constraining the
legitimate end of Section 5 regulation and the second constraining the
legitimate means by which Congress may achieve that end. First, Section 5
provides Congress no authority to redefine the substantive scope of the rights
protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment; rather, Congress
may only "enforce" Fourteenth Amendment rights as they are defined by the
federal judiciary. Second, even when Congress aims to protect a judicially
defined right, Congress may employ only those means that survive heightened
scrutiny with regards to means-ends tailoring. Rather than being assessed
under the conventional "rational relationship" test established by McCulloch v.
Maryland3 in the context of Article I powers, now Section 5 regulations-at
least those that are "prophylactic" in that they prohibit some conduct that the
18. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
19. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
20. While Union Gas, Seminole Tribe, and Alden each involved the exercise of
Congress' Commerce Clause power, the Court recently proclaimed more broadly that
"Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers."
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636
(1999).
21. See Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627; College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
22. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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federal judiciary would find constitutionally permissible 24 -must survive the
stricter standard of "congruence and proportionality" between means and
legitimate ends.25
Numerous scholars have assessed the first doctrinal principle concerning
the scope of legitimate Section 5 ends, some criticizing the Court for giving
Congress too little leeway to redefine the scope of Section 1 rights in at least
certain circumstances. More specifically, some maintain, quite plausibly in my
view, that Section 5 is best understood as contemplating some participation by
Congress in the definition of constitutional norms.26
My focus here, however, is on the second principle concerning the means-
ends relationship, which, with respect, constitutes a sharper break from prior
articulated doctrine.27 Even assuming the Court correctly viewed Congress as
having no special role in interpreting the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the Court acted precipitously in so severely constraining Congress'
choice of means in enforcing judicially defined rights. Perhaps on the surface,
"the notion that § 5 enactments designed to remedy or prevent constitutional
violations should be proportional and congruent to the constitutional wrongs
Congress wishes to stop seems harmless enough."28  But this is a wolf in
24. See notes 158-160 infra and accompanying text.
25. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
26. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 818-26
(1999); Michael C. Doff & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup.
CT. REv. 61 (forthcoming); Steven A. Engel, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment. City of Boeme v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109
YALE L.J. 115 (1999); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 743 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:
A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1997); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
27. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REv 665, 682 (1998) (stating that congruence and proportionality is a "more
rigorous... test between means and ends"); McConnell, supra note 26, at 166 (describing
Boerne as replacing "something akin to 'rational basis scrutiny' with a narrow tailoring
requirement typical of intermediate scrutiny"); Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 477
(proposing that the congruence and proportionality test "seem[s] analogous to the narrow
tailoring required by strict scrutiny"). See also Frank Goodman, Preface, Symposium on The
Supreme Court's Federalism: Real or Imagined?, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi.
9, 18 (2001) (describing the congruence and proportionality test as "ironic" and "anomalous"
because "the Court now seems to be judging statutes designed to protect basic civil rights
with something like the skepticism traditionally reserved for statutes destructive of those
same rights").
It is true that in some very early cases construing Section 5, the Supreme Court
invalidated statutory provisions as lying beyond Congress' Section 5 authority. See notes
63-65 infra and accompanying text. These decisions turned on a narrow understanding of
state action doctrine, however, rather than a narrow construction of Congress' means-ends
discretion. See id. In any event, at least since the beginning of the twentieth century until
Boerne, the Court both articulated and applied McCulloch's liberal means-ends standard to
Section 5 legislation.
28. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 956 (3d ed. 2000).
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sheep's clothing: in fact, Section 5 measures have "suddenly been saddled with
something between intermediate and strict scrutiny, effectuating what can only
be understood as a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of
unconstitutionality. '29 While the Court upheld a variety of prophylactic Section
5 measures over the past four decades, the Court has now held provisions of six
federal statutes to be inappropriate exercises of Section 5 power within the past
four years alone. 0
I argue here that the Supreme Court's decision to subject all prophylactic
Section 5 measures to significantly more rigorous means-ends scrutiny than
measures that carry into execution Congress' various Article I and other powers
cannot persuasively be defended. Some proffered justifications prove
unpersuasive in their entirety, and others are too crude because they at best can
explain some but not all of the four recent cases. In my view, Section 5
provides Congress with the same capacious discretion to select among various
means to achieving legitimate ends as does Article I as construed in McCulloch
v. Maryland. This understanding suggests that, while Boerne itself and College
Savings might be explicable on narrow grounds, the other statutory provisions
invalidated in Boerne's wake should have been upheld as appropriate
enforcement measures-even assuming arguendo that Section 5 does not
provide Congress any interpretive role in construing the meaning of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
Part I of this article explores both the relaxed McCulloch means-ends
standard for executory Article I legislation and the more rigorous Boerne
congruence and proportionality requirement for prophylactic Section 5
enforcement measures, and then clarifies the precise ways in which the latter
deviates from the former. Part II demonstrates that the McCulloch standard
reflects, and thus the Boerne standard deviates from, the original intent and
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II then identifies and
explores various arguments, grounded in both separation of powers and
federalism principles, to evaluate the extent to which they might justify this
isolated deviation; none of these arguments proves satisfactory to the task. Part
IV speculates whether Boerne, coupled with the Court's recent narrowing of
Congress' Commerce Clause authority, portends a more general tightening of
means-ends requirements that will soon constrict all executory powers granted
to Congress by the Constitution.
29. Id. at 959.
30. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
May 2001] 1133
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I. MEANS-ENDS JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
A. McCulloch's Deferential Means-Ends Scrutiny of Executory Laws
Prior to Boerne, the Supreme Court had consistently articulated and
employed a very deferential means-ends test when assessing the validity of
federal legislation, whether enacted pursuant to Congress' original
constitutional authority or the subsequent Reconstruction and other
amendments. In order to assess the extent of Boerne's departure from
established doctrine, we must first explore that doctrine in some detail.
1. McCulloch and Article I.
With respect to congressional authority under Article I, Chief Justice John
Marshall provided the canonical articulation of the requisite means-ends nexus
in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. '31  This relatively weak
constraint reflected the proper method for interpreting the broad powers
implied by a Constitution that merely designates "its important objects" from
which those "minor ingredients which compose those objects [may] be deduced
from the nature of the objects themselves," 32 a method whose propriety is
confirmed by the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause.33
To understand the nature and extent of the judicial deference to
congressional judgments concerning executory laws under the McCulloch
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
32. Id. at 407; see also id. at 408 (stating that the Constitution "does not profess to
enumerate the means by which the powers it confers may be executed"); id. at 409 ("It is not
denied, that the powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of execution.").
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Contrary to a popular misreading of McCulloch,
Chief Justice Marshall did not rely on the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause to confer
broad legislative authority on Congress; rather, he merely interpreted the Clause as
confirming his preceding structural argument concerning the broad scope of implied
congressional powers. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420-21 (explaining that the
clause serves "to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of
incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a
splendid bauble"); CHARLES L. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13-14 (1969) (explaining this point). But see William W. Van
Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the
Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 102, 117 n.53 (1976) (implicitly endorsing Governor Randolph's view that
each enumerated power of each branch of government, not just Congress, implied only a
grant of incidental power "indispensable" to its execution, and that the Necessary and Proper
Clause granted Congress additional and broader authority to exercise incidental powers
beyond those that are "indispensable").
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standard, one must parse its various aspects. By "executory," I mean statutes
that support and implement other statutes that Congress is directly empowered
to enact by the Constitution, or that carry into execution non-legislative powers
vested elsewhere in the Government. The first step in assessing the validity of
executory laws is to identify the legitimate end or power toward which a
particular executory law strives. While it is commonplace to refer to these
legitimate ends as "enumerated powers,' 3 4 this terminology is somewhat
misleading since, as the Court has occasionally acknowledged, certain
congressional powers might be derived from the structure, rather than the
explicit text, of the Constitution.35 In other words, while congressional powers
are "few and defined,' 36 "defined" is not synonymous with "enumerated." 37
34. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (stating that the
Constitution confers upon Congress "not all governmental powers, but only discrete,
enumerated ones").
35. See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-49 (1934) (upholding
Federal Corrupt Practices Act based on implied congressional power to safeguard
presidential elections); Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1891) (holding that
congressional power to enact or modify maritime code, as distinct from the power to regulate
interstate or foreign commerce, is fairly implied by historical inference and the grant of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to Article III courts); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539, 615-22 (1842) (upholding congressional power to enact legislation enforcing the
Fugitive Slave Clause, even though the Clause grants no such express power to Congress);
cf United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 316 n.6 (1990) (conceding that "the Government
has a legitimate interest in preserving the [U.S.] flag's function as an 'incident of
sovereignty,"' though holding that criminalizing flag burning does not advance this interest).
See generally Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 535 (1870) ("[I]n the judgment of
those who adopted the Constitution, there were powers created by it, neither expressly
specified nor deducible from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which
grew out of the aggregate of powers conferred upon the government, or out of the
sovereignty instituted.").
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37. For ease of exposition, however, I shall follow custom and occasionally use the
term "enumerated" powers or ends interchangeably with the more accurate term "primary"
powers or ends to describe the universe of legitimate ends of congressional legislation.
One might argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to enact
executory laws only insofar as they effectuate the foregoing congressional primary powers,
defined strictly to mean the congressional powers provided earlier in the document (from
Article I, § 1 through Article I, § 8) and to exclude the congressional powers provided
anywhere later in the document, originally or as amended. This strikes me as a difficult
position to maintain. First, it requires one to read the subsequent reference to "Government
of the United States" as including only the executive and judicial branches and excluding
Congress, since the Clause also empowers Congress to carry into execution "all other powers
vested" by the Constitution anywhere in the Government. Such a reading is plausible, but
surely not compelled. Second, given McCulloch's supposition that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is merely declaratory of the implied executory power Congress would have enjoyed
even absent this textual confirmation, see note 33 supra, it is difficult to divine a rationale
for limiting the Clause's application to some but not all primary powers granted to Congress,
based solely on where in the document they are located. It would be strikingly odd, for
example, to conclude that Congress could not enact laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution its enumerated power to "propose Amendments to this Constitution" or "call a
Convention for proposing Amendments." U.S. Const. art. V. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
May 2001] 1135
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If a congressional statute is fairly characterized as exercising an
enumerated or other primary power itself, such as a law prohibiting the
interstate shipment of commercial goods would be a direct exercise of
Congress' power to regulate "commerce... among the several States,"38 then
no further analysis is required. But under McCulloch's approach, even a
congressional statute that cannot fairly be characterized as directly exercising
an enumerated power nevertheless lies within Congress' authority if it is
sufficiently tailored to carry into execution such a primary power. The
question here is simply whether the congressional measure facilitates or assists
in some meaningful sense the effective implementation of a primary power.
And the Court, both in McCulloch and thereafter, has interpreted this
requirement of tailoring between implied means and enumerated ends in a very
relaxed manner, deferring to Congress' choice of legislative means so long as it
is "plainly adapted" or "conducive to"39 a legitimate end. As the Court put it
succinctly in McCulloch, "all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that [legitimate] end.., are constitutional."'4
McCulloch did teasingly suggest that the Court would independently assess
whether the claimed executory status of a particular law was merely a pretext
for Congress' effort to exercise a general police power denied it by the
Constitution. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, "should Congress, under
the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects
not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this
tribunal... to say that such an act was not the law of the land. '41 But the Court
quickly made clear that its assessment of "pretext" would consist merely of
ensuring that the law "is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted
to the government ....- 42
McCulloch also rejected the notion that the courts should independently
evaluate whether a particular executory law is truly "necessary" to serve the
legitimate end, in the sense of determining whether Congress' chosen means,
compared to other means Congress could have employed, is a particularly
effective or desirable way of addressing the problem Congress is trying to
solve. First, Marshall defined the term "necessary" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause quite liberally, concluding that "[t]o employ the means necessary
U.S. 112, 281, 285-92 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that prior cases "establish that Congress brings to the protection and facilitation of the
exercise of privileges of United States citizenship all of its power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause").
38. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421.
40. Id. Lower federal courts have consistently applied the McCulloch standard. See,
e.g., United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the McCulloch
standard requires only "that the effectuating legislation bear a rational relationship to a
permissible constitutional end").
41. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
42. Id.
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to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to
produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without
which the end would be entirely unattainable."43 Second, in light of this liberal
construction, he concluded that the necessity of a given measure was
appropriately left to congressional rather than judicial determination. If an
executory law is "an appropriate measure," then
the degree of its necessity, as has been very justly observed, is to be discussed
in another place.... But where the law is not prohibited, and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the
line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative
ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power. 44
Thus Congress is left to its best judgment concerning the necessity of "proper"
executory laws: the Necessary and Proper Clause "cannot be construed to
restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to
exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into execution
the constitutional powers of the government. '45  From the perspective of
judicial review, one might say that the "necessary" component of the necessary
and proper formulation for valid executory laws has essentially been construed
to lack independent bite, and all the constraining work (such as it is) is done by
the "proper" component of the test.46 As the Court has repeated again and
43. Id. at 413-14.
44. Id. at 423.
45. Id. at 420. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall had already advanced this interpretation
of the Necessary and Proper Clause fifteen years earlier in United States v. Fisher, where he
explained that
[fin construing this clause it would be incorrect and would produce endless difficulties, if the
opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not indispensably
necessary to give effect to a specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for
that purpose, it might be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary because the end
might be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be
empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted
by the constitution.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
46. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932) ("The extent to which,
as means, [Congress' provisions] conduce to that [legitimate] end, the degree of their
efficiency, the closeness of their relation to the end sought to be attained, are matters
addressed to the judgment of the Legislature, and not to that of the courts."); Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 542 (1870) ("The degree of the necessity for any
congressional enactment... is for consideration in Congress, not here.").
Professor Vicki Jackson has suggested to me that, in an appropriate case, a court might
well require the supposed necessity of a particular measure to pass a "straight-face" test of
credulity. Suppose, for example, Congress enacted legislation requiring all buildings to have
green painted roofs on the premise that the color green would operate to repel nuclear
missiles launched from beyond our borders. A court might well scrutinize, at least to some
extent, whether this premise has any credible evidentiary support providing a rational reason
to believe that the means of green painting would, in any appreciable way as compared to
other alternatives, serve the legitimate end of repelling foreign attack. Of course, it is
extremely unlikely that Congress would ever enact such a statute absent sufficient change in
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again in a myriad of situations, "[i]f it can be seen that the means adopted are
really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to
which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the
means adopted, and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional
determination alone. 47
knowledge or conditions making it seem far more reasonable under the then-prevailing
circumstances than such a law strikes us today. In any event, for present purposes it seems
fair to put aside such a de minimis inquiry when describing the conventional McCulloch
standard.
47. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934) (citation omitted). As
this and many other cases (including McCulloch) make clear, the term "proper" is best
interpreted as referring simply to the fit between means and ends. See, e.g., Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) ("Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted
to carry out the objects the amendments have in view.... "); 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1248, at 122 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) ("[T]he other word [proper] ... has a sense at once
admonitory and directory. It requires, that the means should be, bonafide, appropriate to the
end.").
A handful of scholars have recently argued, however, that the term "proper" embraces
more than merely a relationship between means and ends. Rather, they suggest, "proper"
implies a broad jurisdictional constraint on legislative authority; Congress may enact only
those laws that are considered proper for Congress to enact in the sense that the laws do not
trench on the powers or rights of other actors. According to this jurisdictional reading of the
term, Congress' choice of means is proper only if it conforms to a set of background
constitutional principles of federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. See, e.g.,
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REv. 795, 812-19
(1996); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993); cf. David E.
Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 93 (1985)
(executory statute violating general principle of state immunity is not "proper"). This
revisionist view purports to provide a textual hook for the authors' proposal that executory
legislation be judicially scrutinized for consistency with such background constitutional
principles. Following this lead, the Supreme Court recently articulated, albeit in passing,
such a jurisdictional interpretation of "proper." See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
923-24 (1997) ("When a 'La[w] ... for carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause
violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions
we mentioned earlier, it is not a 'La[w ]... proper for carrying into Execution the
Commerce Clause.... ."') (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Lawson & Granger,
supra).
This revisionist view of "proper" is textually, analytically and historically incorrect, and
the textual hook it claims for aggressive judicial review is chimerical. To mention briefly
just a few difficulties the revisionist view confronts: (1) "proper" clearly modifies "for
carrying into execution" rather than the "laws" themselves, and thus syntactically serves a
teleological function, whereas according to the revisionist view the clause should have
provided a congressional power to "make all [proper] Laws which shall be necessary for
carrying into Execution" Congress' primary powers; (2) the McCulloch standard separately
captures the notion, in addition to the requirement of propriety, that all laws (and not just
executory laws, as the revisionist view puzzlingly suggests) must "not [be] prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution," McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421;
and (3) while the term "proper" was indeed used on occasion by various Framer-era
statespersons in a broader jurisdictional sense, the Court as well as statespersons focusing on
the term "proper" as used in the Necessary and Proper Clause have consistently employed
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Finally, it is notable that McCulloch did not carefully consider whether the
evil to be addressed by the statute is real or substantial, thus eschewing any
rigorous independent assessment of the need for congressional action in the
first place.43 Both McCulloch and future cases accept that, when Congress
chooses either to exercise an enumerated constitutional power directly or to
enact an executory law subservient thereto, Congress decides whether the
problem it is purporting to solve through legislation is worthy of any legislative
response in the first place. For example, if Congress chooses to "punish those
who steal letters from the post office, or rob the mail,"49 the courts will not
independently inquire whether such postal theft constitutes a widespread or
serious problem requiring some solution.50 Rather, under the traditionally
relaxed McCulloch standard, "[ilt is enough if it can be seen that in any degree,
or under reasonably conceivable circumstances, there is an actual relation
between the means and the end."5'
Because the four variables considered here-proper, pretext, necessary,
and need for legislation-capture related though discrete concepts, it might be
useful to distinguish them through an example. Suppose Congress offers
lifetime public employment to all persons aged 18-24 years who agree to serve
two years in the armed forces. Whether this executory legislation is "proper"
the term in its more natural, teleological sense. To be sure, "proper" might be viewed as a
jurisdictional limitation, but only in the sense that Congress' jurisdiction with respect to
executory means is limited to those means which are "plainly adapted" to achieve its
legitimate primary ends. See, e.g., id. at 423 (equating "being an appropriate measure" with
being "really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government"); Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 539 (1870) (referring to "appropriate means, or means
conducive to the execution of any or all of the powers of Congress, or of the government");
Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) ("Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is,
adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view .. "). I will leave further
elaboration of the revisionist view's shortcomings for another day.
48. McCulloch says no more than that "[tihe original act was permitted to expire; but a
short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the
government, convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity,
and induced the passage of the present law." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402. This bespeaks a
deference to Congress rather than an independent judicial assessment of need.
49. Id. at 417.
50. Perhaps a court might well require the purported evil being addressed to pass a
"straight-face" test of credulity as well (in addition to such a test for "necessity," see note 46
supra). If, for example, Congress enacted legislation requiring all buildings to have green
painted roofs in order to repel a predicted attack from alien beings thought to be enervated
upon seeing the color green, a court might well examine the rationality of responding to this
perceived evil. Again, however, for the present purpose of describing the conventional
McCulloch standard we can put such a de minimis inquiry aside.
51. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932); see also 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §432, at 417 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) ("[Congress] must have a wide discretion, as to the choice of
means; and the only limitation upon that discretion would seem to be, that the means are
appropriate to the end. And this must naturally admit of considerable latitude; for the
relation between the action and the end ... is not always so direct and palpable, as to strike
the eye of every observer.").
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turns on the extent to which it is designed to carry into execution a primary
power, here the enumerated power to "raise and support Armies. 52 (The
McCulloch standard asks simply whether inducing the enlistment of military
personnel is "plainly adapted" or "conducive to" raising an army, and the
answer is obviously yes.) Whether this executory legislation is properly
viewed as an illegitimate "pretext" for the exercise of an impermissible police
power would presumably-for the Court never clearly explained the factual or
normative basis for such a claim-turn on a gestalt sense of various features,
such as the legislation's under- and overinclusiveness for its purported
purpose.53 (McCulloch's progeny suggests this assessment is either nonexistent
or highly deferential.) Whether this executory legislation is "necessary" turns
on the extent to which sufficient troops could be raised through other available
means, such as appeals to patriotism. (McCulloch holds that this comparative
assessment is left to the sound discretion of Congress.) Whether this executory
legislation is "needed" turns on whether the lifetime employment program
addresses a true as opposed to a fanciful problem, in other words, whether there
is a need to enlarge the size of Armed Forces troops. (McCulloch provides
only glancing mention of this question of need, leaving such judgment to
Congress as well.5 4)
While the scope of Congress' implied executory powers has not
commanded much judicial and scholarly attention over the past decade,
Congress has relied upon this broad scope to enact a wide variety of important
statutes governing a broad swath of conduct. Indeed, careful reflection reveals
that many congressional regulations of intrastate activities having interstate
effects, and most congressional statutes that preempt state policies, are
grounded in Congress' implied or "necessary and proper" powers.5 5 Moreover,
almost the entirety of the federal criminal justice system is built upon a
Necessary and Proper Clause foundation. As McCulloch itself recognized,
52. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
53. For example, suppose Congress required all able-bodied adults to own, to train
themselves to use, and to carry handguns, ostensibly to enhance the military preparedness of
the country in the event of a foreign invasion of troops. At least absent some indication of
an immediate such threat, a court might likely cite the apparent radically overinclusive
nature of the requirement (as compared to focused military training for service-eligible
youths) as evidence that the legislation is an impermissible pretext for an exercise of a
general police power designed to deter criminals from preying on others.
54. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422 ("That it is a convenient, a useful, and
essential instrument in the prosecution of [the United States'] fiscal operations, is not now
subject of controversy.").
55. See David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint
on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 109-19 (1998) (explaining
that the Necessary and Proper Clause is a proper foundation for many laws described as
enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause power); Stephen Gardbaum, supra note 47, at 803-19
(explaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause is the primary source of Congress' powers
to regulate local activity and preempt state law).
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Congress' enumerated powers authorize extremely few criminal proscriptions; 56
almost all federal criminal laws are predicated on implied powers, justified as
proper means to achieving enumerated or other primary ends.57 And the
implied power to establish a federal criminal code itself implies the subservient
power to punish criminals, which in turn implies the subservient power to build
and maintain prisons and to operate supervised release systems, and so on.58
Thus, while the Necessary and Proper Clause gets little play today in the courts
or media, broad and significant segments of the United States Code depend on
the Court's relaxed means-ends tailoring requirement for implied Article I
legislation.
2. McCulloch and subsequent enforcement clauses.
Although the Reconstruction and later Amendments expressly granting
new powers to Congress use the slightly different locution of "appropriate"
rather than "necessary and proper,"59 the Supreme Court has continued to
articulate the very same deferential means-ends test when scrutinizing exercises
of Congress' additional enforcement powers. In its first case construing the
Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause, the Court maintained that
"[w]hatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects
the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the
prohibitions they contain.., if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power."' 6  The Court repeated this standard in its first case
construing the Eighteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause, explaining that
It is likewise well settled that where the means adopted by Congress are not
56. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 416-17 (Congress' express authority to
punish misconduct is limited to counterfeiting, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6, and piracy on
the high seas and offenses against the law of nations, id. cl. 10). But see U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 3, cl. 2 (giving Congress the power to "declare the Punishment of Treason").
57. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417 (explaining that the enumerated power
to establish post offices implies executory power to punish mail theft).
58. See, e.g., Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (holding that the
power to prosecute for federal offenses implies the authority to detain accused persons
deemed incompetent to stand trial pending possible recovery of sufficient competence).
59. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII (power to enforce prohibition of slavery by
"appropriate legislation"); id. amend. XIV (various rights against states, House
apportionment, federal official limitations, and public debt claims); id. amend. XV
(prohibition of racial discrimination in voting); id amend. XVIII (repealed 1933)
(prohibition of liquor); id. amend. XIX (prohibition of sex discrimination in voting); id.
amend. XXIII (representation of seat of government); id. amend. XXIV (prohibition of poll
tax); id. amend. XXVI (prohibition of age discrimination in voting) [hereinafter the
Enforcement Clauses].
60. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879); see also The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883) (explaining that Section 5 authorizes Congress to adopt "corrective
legislation; that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the
states may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making
or enforcing").
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prohibited and are calculated to effect the object intrusted to it, this Court may
not inquire into the degree of their necessity; as this would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread upon legislative
ground. 6
1
And throughout the three decades preceding Boerne, the Court continued to
reiterate the same deferential test. As the Court explained in Katzenbach v.
Morgan, "the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what
constitutes 'appropriate legislation' under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 62
To be sure, in two early cases construing Section 5 the Supreme Court
invalidated certain statutory provisions as lying beyond Congress' authority.6 3
One might thus suggest that, in deed if not word, at least at one early point the
Supreme Court evaluated Section 5 measures with skepticism rather than
deference. Perhaps so. However, these early decisions are best understood as
reflecting a rigorous application of the state action doctrine rather than a
rigorous application of a means-ends test. The statutes invalidated in each of
the cases targeted private rather than state conduct, whereas the Court viewed
the Enforcement Clauses as authorizing Congress to regulate only state and not
private conduct.64 Thus the Court appeared to reject categorically the means of
private regulation, rather than hold these particular instances of private
61. James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559 (1924); see also Lambert v.
Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596-97 (1926) (equating "necessary and proper" under Article I,
Section 8 with "appropriate" under Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment).
62. 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
439-44 (1968) (applying the same test to the Thirteenth Amendment's identically worded
Enforcement Clause); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (applying
the same test to the Fifteenth Amendment's identically worded Enforcement Clause); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (reaffirming South Carolina v. Katzenbach
and stating that the means must be "'appropriate,' as that term is defined in McCulloch v.
Maryland").
63. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating a statute proscribing
private conspiracy to deprive persons of equal protection of the laws); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating statutory provisions prohibiting private race
discrimination in various public accommodations); see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127
(1903) (invalidating statute prohibiting private interference with voting as lying beyond
Congress' Section 2 power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment).
64. See Harris, 106 U.S. at 640 ("As, therefore, the section of the law under
consideration is directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference
to the laws of the State or their administration by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that
it is not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18 ("[T]he power given is limited by its object, and any
legislation by Congress in the matter must necessarily be corrective in its character, adapted
to counteract and redress the operation of such prohibited state laws or proceedings of state
officers."); James, 190 U.S. at 139 ("[A] statute which purports to punish purely individual
action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred by the Fifteenth
Amendment upon Congress to prevent action by the State through some one or more of its
official representatives .... "). For discussion of this premise and its reapplication in
Morrison, see notes 134-136 infra and accompanying text.
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regulation to a heightened means-ends standard. In fact, the Court expressly
confirmed, by word at least, Congress' authority to prevent or remedy
misconduct attributable to state action through measures deemed by Congress
to be "necessary and proper." It is thus unclear the extent to which these early
cases are properly viewed as foreshadowing the Court's recent invigoration of
means-ends scrutiny. What is quite clear, however, is that at least since the
beginning of the twentieth century through its decision in Boerne, the Court
routinely both articulated and applied McCulloch's liberal means-ends standard
to Section 5 and other Enforcement Clause legislation.
B. The Boerne [R]Evolution
1. Boerne and the emergence of the congruence and proportionality test.
In City of Boerne v. Flores,66 the Supreme Court departed sharply from the
longstanding tradition of deferential means-ends scrutiny. Boerne concerned
the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),67
which was Congress' attempt to override the Court's prior determination in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith6s that the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause provides no exemption from neutral laws
of general applicability. RFRA purported to restore a pre-Smith balancing test
that was more solicitous of free exercise claims brought against both state and
federal laws: Congress sought to preclude even neutrally applicable laws from
substantially burdening the exercise of religion unless they were narrowly
tailored to furthering a compelling governmental interest. 69 While RFRA's
application to federal statutes was predicated on Congress' various Article I
powers supporting those specific statutes, RFRA's application to state statutes
was predicated on Congress' Section 5 authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Boerne, the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as it applies to the states,
holding the statute lay beyond Congress' Section 5 authority.70 The Court
65. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14 (Section 5 authorizes
"corrective legislation; that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such
laws as the states may adopt or enforce .... "); cf. id. at 21 (construing the Thirteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause as affording Congress "a right to enact all necessary and
proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery").
66. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
68. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
69. This was the test imposed by the Supreme Court's pre-Smith case law. See, e.g.,
Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (analyzing under strict scrutiny and invalidating
neutrally applicable state unemployment compensation rules where their application
unjustifiably infringed free exercise of religion).
70. A number of lower federal courts have upheld RFRA's application to federal
May 2001) 1143
HeinOnline  -- 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1143 2000-2001
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
acknowledged up front that it had long evaluated Section 5 legislation with
significant deference to congressional judgments.71 But "'[a]s broad as the
congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited." 7 2 And the Court then
embarked on a two-step argument defining and sharpening those limits.
a. The scope of legitimate Section 5 ends.
First, the Court considered the scope of the legitimate ends that Section 5
authorizes Congress to pursue. Specifically, the Court asked whether Section 5
grants Congress any power, in the course of "enforc[ing]" the Fourteenth
Amendment's rights, substantively to redefine the scope of those rights as
compared to the federal judiciary's definition. While acknowledging some
language in Katzenbach v. Morgan3 suggesting this possibility,74 the Court
emphatically rejected it here, explaining:
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the
suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is. It is been given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress
would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the
"provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. '75
The Court first explained that the drafting history of the Fourteenth
Amendment "confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the
Enforcement Clause. '76 The Court traced the development of the clause from
the original proposed draft offered by Representative John Bingham of Ohio to
the final version ultimately adopted.7 7 The Bingham proposal purported to
grant seemingly broad powers to Congress to both determine and enforce
various rights against state action:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
government programs. See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173, 175 & n.1 (3d Cir.
1999). But see Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional, Period, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (1998) (arguing that RFRA is
unconstitutional as applied to federal law as well, on separation of powers grounds).
71. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18.
72. Id. at 518 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970)).
73. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
74. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28 (noting that one of Morgan's rationales for upholding a
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 could be understood as maintaining that
Congress may itself decide what constitutes invidious discrimination, but explaining "[t]his
is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one" of that precedent).
75. Id. at 519.
76. Id. at 520.
77. Id. at 520-23.
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citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.78
According to the Court, this formulation was rejected primarily because it
raised "concerns ... regarding broad congressional power to prescribe uniform
national laws with respect to life, liberty, and property," 79 and secondarily
because "some thought [it] departed from that tradition [of affording the
Supreme Court "primary authority" to interpret the Constitution] by vesting in
Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the meaning of the new
Amendment through legislation."80  Both concerns were resolved, in the
Court's view, by redrafting the Amendment so as to make clear that the "power
to interpret" Section 1 "in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary,"81 and
that Congress may merely enforce such judicial interpretations.
After explaining in detail how this understanding of the limited scope of
Section 5's "legitimate end" comported with decades of prior judicial precedent
upholding Section 5 enforcement measures,82 the Court returned to the notion
that the judiciary, and not Congress, is entitled to provide the interpretation of
Section 1 rights which Congress may "enforce." The Court warned that "[i]f
Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means."'8 3 This concern assumes, of course, that the
Fourteenth Amendment's "meaning" is fixed by judicial pronouncement-a
premise the Court hastened to reaffirm. 4 Perhaps provoked by Congress' open
desire to override the Court's previous interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause in Smith, 5 the Court explained that:
78. Id. at 520 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
79. Id. at 523.
80. Id. at 524.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 524-28.
83. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
84. For the canonical statement of this claim of interpretive supremacy, see Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), stating that "[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,
and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." See also, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-
05 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962). Several scholars have discussed this Court-centric approach to constitutional
interpretation. Compare, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359 (1997) (defending judicial
interpretive supremacy), with Edwin Meese III, Perspective on the Authoritativeness of
Supreme Court Decisions: The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987)
(challenging judicial interpretive supremacy), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994)
(same).
85. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515 (noting RFRA's stated purposes "(1) to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner... and to guarantee its application
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When the political branches of the Government act against the background of
a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its
precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare
decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. 86
b. The scope of permissible Section 5 means.
After defining the legitimate ends of Section 5 power narrowly, the Court
next articulated a novel and similarly narrow interpretation of the scope of
congressional means permissible to achieve those ends. The two moves were
related, in the sense that the constraint on means was expressly linked to the
desire to enforce the constraint on ends. The Court explained that "[t]here must
be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection,
legislation may become substantive in operation and effect." 87  The Court
conceded that Congress is not limited strictly to fine-tuning the contours of
judicial remedies for judicially determined violations. Rather, Section 5
legislation can be "prophylactic" in the sense that "[legislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional. ."8 And the Court used some language superficially
hinting at a relaxed means-ends standard. 9 But the Court then immediately
clarified that the actual test to be applied is significantly more stringent: for
such prophylactic legislation there still "must be a congruence between the
means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial
measures must be considered in light of the evil presented."90
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that "It]he stringent test
RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence"
between means and legitimate ends.91 To begin with, the "evil presented"
appeared insubstantial. "In contrast to the record which confronted Congress
in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a
claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government") (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 536.
87. Id. at 519-20.
88. Id. at 518.
89. Id. at 517 (Section 5 power extends to "whatever tends to enforce submission to
the prohibitions [that the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions] contain") (quoting Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)).
90. Id. at 530 (citation omitted). See Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 530-31 (5th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting suggestion that Boerne and its progeny maintained fidelity to
McCulloch's rational basis tradition, concluding "[i]t could not be clearer that congruence
and proportionality is a considerably more stringent standard of review than is rational
basis").
91. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
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and the judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks
examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry,"92 the only legitimate congressional target given the Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. Congressional hearings
mentioned no episodes of such persecution in the past forty years, and indeed
testimony before Congress indicated that intentional discrimination through the
use of generally applicable statutes is now quite rare.93
Moreover, by potentially subjecting every neutral state regulation to strict
scrutiny, RFRA would impose a "considerable congressional intrusion into the
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority ... -94 These "substantial
costs [that] RFRA exacts... far exceed any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in
Smith."'  Given the broad scope and magnitude of the imposed burden
compared to the insubstantial evil to be addressed, the Court concluded that
"RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that
it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior [as judicially defined]. '9 6
Thus, the Court in Boerne articulated a restrained vision of both the scope
of Section 5's legitimate ends and the scope of permissible legislative means to
achieve those ends. 97 While the first doctrinal test arguably merely clarified an
ambiguity in prior case law,98 the second doctrinal test clearly deviated from the
Court's longstanding articulation and application of the more deferential
McCulloch means-ends standard.
2. Boeme 's progeny.
When Boerne was decided, one might have wondered whether the
"congruence and proportionality" formulation would prove to be merely case-
specific rhetoric describing the ill-fitting RFRA, or instead would signal an
important shift in means-ends analysis. The Supreme Court resolved any
uncertainty immediately and emphatically: within the next four terms, the
Court held five more statutory provisions to be inappropriate exercises of
Section 5 authority.
Florida Prepaid-In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,99 the Court held that the Patent and Plant
92. Id. at 530.
93. Id. at 530-31.
94. Id. at 534.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 532.
97. No Justice dissented from either of these aspects of Boerne.
98. See note 74 supra.
99. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act,1 0 which purported to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases, could not be sustained
as Section 5 enforcement legislation. Congress justified the Act as an
acceptable enforcement measure on the ground that a patent is a form of
property, and thus a state's act of infringing a patent can constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.10'
After summarizing its holding in Boerne, the Court explained that "for
Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to
remedying or preventing such conduct."'0 The Court concluded that Congress
fell short on both fronts.
The Court defined the legitimate end plausibly animating the Act as that of
addressing "unremedied patent infringement by the States."'103 The Court
immediately complained, however, that in reviewing the legislative record, it
found that "Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States,
let alone a pattern of constitutional violations."' 04 In any event, instances of
patent infringement would constitute a due process violation only where the
state provided an inadequate postdeprivation remedy, 05 a more nuanced issue
that Congress barely considered, and where the deprivation was intentional
rather than negligent, which the legislative record revealed to be the exception
rather than the rule. 06 Thus, the "Act does not respond to a history of
'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights' of the sort
Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation."1 7
Given the scant record of constitutional violations, the Court considered
the Act's abrogation provision subjecting states to "expansive liability"'' 0 out
of proportion to the supposed evil being addressed. Congress did not limit state
liability to instances involving inadequate state remedies, or involving policy-
based or even nonnegligent infringements, or occurring in states with a high
incidence of patent infringment. 09  Instead, "Congress made all States
immediately amenable to suit in federal court for all kinds of possible patent
100. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994).
101. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637.
102. Id. at 639.
103. Id. at 640.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 643 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529-31 (1981); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984)). Here, the Court skated over some tricky questions as
to whether the Parratt line of cases should apply to patent infringement. See Daniel J.
Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1011, 1060-61 (2000) (questioning whether patent infringement is better viewed as
raising a substantive rather than procedural due process claim).
106. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
107. Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
108. Id. at 646.
109. Id. at 647.
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infringement and for an indefinite duration."110 This "indiscriminate scope...
is particularly incongruous," since "it simply cannot be said that 'many of [the
acts of infringement] affected by the congressional enactment have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional."'' Thus, the Act's "apparent and more
basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to
place States on the same footing as private parties under that regime. These are
proper Article I concerns, but that Article does not give Congress the power to
enact such legislation after Seminole Tribe."' 2
College Savings Bank-College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board'1 3 considered whether the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act,"4 which purported to authorize private suits for
damages against states to enforce the Lanham Act,"5 was a valid Section 5
measure for purposes of abrogating state sovereign immunity. The more
precise question was whether the Lanham Act's false-advertising provisions
protect a "property" interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court considered, but rejected, two
claimed property interests in this context: "(1) a right to be free from a
business competitor's false advertising about its own product, and (2) a more
generalized right to be secure in one's business interests."" 6 The Court
concluded that, because a right against false advertising does not involve a
"right to exclude," there is no "property right in freedom from a competitor's
false advertising about its own products.""17 And, more generally, "the activity
of making a profit is not property in the ordinary sense .... I'l The Court thus
rejected the proposed Section 5 foundation for the abrogating Act without
having to then resort to the congruence and proportionality standard." 9 In other
words, where there is no judicially defined violation of Section 1 that Congress
can even plausibly claim to be enforcing, there is no legitimate Section 5 end
for which the Court need explore the means-ends relationship. 20
Kimel-In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,12' the Court considered
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533).
112. Id. at 647-48.
113. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
114. Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992).
115. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
116. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 672.
117. Id. at673.
118. Id. at 675.
119. Id. (finding no need to perform this test given the absence of an unconstitutional
deprivation of property).
120. The Court also considered but rejected the argument that a state's decision to
engage in activities regulated by the Lanham Act operated as a constructive waiver of the
state's immunity. Id. at 675-87.
121. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), l22 which makes
it unlawful for an employer (including a state) to discriminate in employment
decisions on the basis of age, was enacted pursuant to Section 5 and therefore
could validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. 2 3 Applying the "congruence
and proportionality" standard, the Court concluded that the ADEA was not
"appropriate legislation" under Section 5.124
As in Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the Court determined that "the
substantive requirements the ADEA imposes on state and local governments
are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be
targeted by the Act."'l Under the Court's age discrimination precedents, states
may discriminate on the basis of age without violating Section 1 so long as the
age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.12 6 Because
rational reasons for such classifications will frequently if not almost invariably
exist, age discrimination is generally not unconstitutional. As a result the
ADEA, "through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating
factor, prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices
than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal
protection, rational basis standard."' 127 This judgment was confirmed by the
Court's examination of the ADEA's legislative record, in which "Congress
never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation."''2
Thus, "[i]n light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive
requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age
discrimination by the States,"'1 29 the Act could not be characterized as a valid
Section 5 enforcement measure.
Morrison-In United States v. Morrison,'30 the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a provision of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) providing victims of gender-motivated violence with a federal civil
action against the perpetrator. 3' The Court invalidated the provision, holding
that it could not be justified as an exercise of either Congress' power to regulate
122. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994).
123. The Court acknowledged its previous determination in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226 (1983), that Congress could apply the ADEA to state and local government
employment decisions pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, but noted that,
post-Seminole Tribe, Congress could enforce the ADEA through private damages suits
against states only if the Act could be justified on Section 5 grounds as well. Kimel, 528
U.S. at 76-80.
124. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
125. Id. at 83.
126. Id. at 83-87.
127. Id. at 86.
128. Id. at 89.
129. Id. at 91.
130. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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132
Unlike in the previous four cases, the Court did not directly dispute
Congress' pronouncement and findings that numerous participants in state
criminal justice systems engage in behavior satisfying the judicially crafted
standards for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. 33 The Court held,
however, that the civil remedy provision was not a congruent and proportional
response to this pattern of presumably unconstitutional activity because the
provision provided a right of action against misconduct by private rather than
state actors. As the Court explained, the provision "is not aimed at proscribing
discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself
proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who
have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.' 34 Moreover, viewed
as a prophylactic measure, the VAWA provision in question was also overly
broad according to the Court, since it applied uniformly throughout the nation,
rather than merely in states with congressionally documented records of this
type of gender discrimination. 35 Thus, even accepting Congress' identification
of a constitutional "evil" to be addressed, the Court found the provision
insufficiently tailored to qualify as an enforcement of Section 5: "the remedy is
simply not 'corrective in its character, adapted to counteract and redress the
operation of such prohibited [s]tate laws or proceedings of [s]tate officers." 1 36
Garrett-In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,137
the Court held that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA),' which prohibits state and other employers from discriminating in
various ways against employees on the basis of disability, was not a valid
Section 5 measure. As a result, Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity and authorize victims of discrimination to sue states for
compensatory damages.
Applying the now-familiar doctrine, the Court first identified the scope of
132. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, 619-21.
133. The Court observed that, based on a "voluminous" record, "Congress concluded
that these discriminatory stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution
of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims
of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually convicted of
gender-motivated violence." Id. at 620. The Court did not disclaim the suggestion that the
behavior documented in the legislative record rose to the level of unconstitutional conduct
according to the Court's own intermediate scrutiny standard.
134. Id. at 626. For an argument that the provision's targeting of private misconduct
still operated, albeit indirectly, to prevent or remedy the identified unconstitutional behavior,
see Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 1351, 1353-58 (2000). This essay also challenges the Court's broad language
suggesting that private remedies are per se excluded as appropriate Section 5 measures. Id.
at 1359-72.
135. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27.
136. Id. at 625 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883)).
137. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
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the constitutional right at issue and interpreted prior case law to hold that
disability discrimination is unconstitutional only if it fails to satisfy rational
basis review.139 The Court next asked whether Congress identified a history
and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against
the disabled. The Court held that the record compiled by Congress was
inadequate to the task: most of the examples of discrimination did not involve
state action, and those that did were anectodal in nature.140 In the end, the
139. Here, the Court read some language in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), for less than it could have been worth. See id. at 448
(arguably suggesting that state decisionmaking reflecting "negative attitudes" toward or
"fear" of persons with disabilities is unconstitutional).
140. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-65. In the course of explaining the legislative record's
inadequacy, the Court stated that evidence of unconstitutional conduct by local as opposed to
state governmental entities did not count:
Respondents contend that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend not
only to States themselves, but to units of local governments, such as cities and counties. All
of these, they say, are "state actors" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is
quite true, but the Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local
government. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). These entities are
subject to private claims for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to rely
on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. It would make no sense to
consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when
only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at 965.
This evidentiary limitation is quite puzzling on its face. It is true that, in Garrett,
Congress did not need to rely on Section 5 to regulate the employment practices of local
governmental units and to authorize private damages suits to enforce those regulations,
because Title I's application to public employers falls within Congress' Commerce Clause
authority. Reliance on Section 5 was important only as a basis for authorizing private
damages suits against the states themselves. But in other contexts (such as the Voting Rights
Act provisions that the Court repeatedly uses as a baseline for assessing congruence and
proportionality, see id. at 967), Congress sometimes must rely on Section 5 not just for
abrogation, but for the power to regulate at all-so as to authorize private suits for injunctive
relief or United States suits for retrospective relief. In such circumstances, it is difficult to
understand why Congress could not enact enforcement measures in response to Section 1
violations by any state actors, including local government units. And I see no reason why
there should be a different standard for assessing Section 5 power depending on whether a
particular measure's application to local governmental units happens to lie within Congress'
Article I power. The Court appears here simply to have forgotten that Section 5 is an
independent font of power, not merely an abrogation-authorizing provision.
The aforementioned paragraph might be read as suggesting that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity even under a valid Section 5 regulation unless Congress
can additionally demonstrate that there is a need for such abrogation, requiring some
evidence of misconduct by the state rather than merely by local entities. But see note 156
infra (challenging any such suggestion). Alternatively, the paragraph might be read as an
extension of the Court's previous suggestion that, if Congress wants to redress
unconstitutional behavior that (according to the record evidence) occurs only in some states,
Congress must target its remedy toward those states rather than apply the remedy
indiscriminately across the nation. See text accompanying note 135 supra. Perhaps the
Court is stating here that a congruent and proportional remedy must target only those
government levels within a single state for which there is record evidence of unconstitutional
conduct.
1152 [Vol. 53:1127
HeinOnline  -- 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1152 2000-2001
"APPROPRIATE" CONSTRAINTS
record evidence simply "fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled."'141
Moreover, the Court continued, even were there sufficient evidence of a pattern
of unconstitutional discrimination by the states, "the rights and remedies
created by the ADA against the States would raise the same sort of concerns as
to congruence and proportionality as were found in" Boerne)42 For example,
the ADA requires state employers to accommodate persons with disabilities
even though employers frequently have rational reasons to refrain from doing
so, and the ADA places certain evidentiary burdens on employers to justify
their inaction even though the Constitution, claimed the Court, places these
evidentiary burdens on employees. 43
C. Parsing Section 5's Heightened Means-Ends Scrutiny: What Do
"Congruence and Proportionality" Mean?
Throughout Boerne and its progeny, the Supreme Court never clearly
defined the distinctive meanings of, or requirements imposed by, the two
components of the composite phrase "congruence and proportionality."' 44 Of
course, in fairness to the Court, it may not have focused much on any precise
conceptual distinction between these two components, instead wielding the
phrase loosely to capture a set of interrelated and perhaps somewhat amorphous
ideas about means-ends relationships. As a result, perhaps one should not push
too hard to divine the precise and separable content of "congruence" and
"proportionality" as used by the Court. But for ease of exposition, and at the
risk of imposing some unintended-perhaps even undesired-clarity on the
Court's choice of language, I shall try here to reformulate the substance of the
Court's concerns about Section 5's means-ends nexus, and then link that
reformulation to a plausible (and I hope analytically constructive)
understanding of the two components.
The Court's application of the congruence and proportionality standard in
this line of cases appears to engage two different lines of inquiry. The first
explores the instrumental relationship between Congress' means and ends. As
the Court repeatedly makes clear, a Section 5 measure must target state conduct
that the judiciary itself understands to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
I doubt that the paragraph was intended to embrace either of these two alternative
interpretations (rather than reflecting a lack of care in considering the point of Section 5
justification). But if so, this paragraph portends yet another unexplained and significant
deviation from McCulloch's conventional means-ends test.
141. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965.
142. Id. at 966.
143. Id. at 966-67.
144. Indeed careful parsing of the Court's usage of the two components separately
suggests that the Court may not have deployed them consistently, even within as well as
across, the several decisions.
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restrictions on state action. In other words, Congress "must identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must
tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."' 145 This
inquiry is best exemplified by College Savings. Once the Court concluded that
a state business' allegedly false advertising did not deprive a competitor of any
Fourteenth Amendment "property" interest as the Court defined the term, it
easily followed that Congress' prohibition of this business practice did not
prevent any conduct violating a judicially defined right.146  As such, the
regulation obviously could not be characterized as "plainly adapted" to
enforcing a Section 1 right, and the Court held the provision beyond Congress'
Section 5 authority without further analysis. Put differently, the provision was
radically underinclusive as compared to the legitimate Section 5 end because it
did not prohibit or remedy any unconstitutional state conduct. This inquiry-
whether the measure actually prevents or remedies a sufficient quantity of
identifiable constitutional violations or is instead too underinclusive-is best
understood as capturing the Court's notion of "congruence."
Boerne and its progeny engage a second distinct inquiry, one focusing on
the calibration or balance between the magnitude of the prophylactic remedy
and the magnitude of the wrong or problem being addressed. As the Court
explained in Boerne, "[tihe appropriateness of remedial measures must be
considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to
address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one."' 47
The question here is whether the remedy is too much of a blunderbuss
compared to the targeted harm. This multifaceted inquiry is best understood as
capturing the Court's notion of "proportionality."
Parsing this inquiry further, the Court's consideration of the magnitude of a
remedial measure reflects both quantitative and qualitative concerns. The
quantitative dimension focuses on the extent to which the measure is
overinclusive, i.e., how much constitutional conduct does the measure prohibit
or regulate, beyond the unconstitutional conduct that it purports to target. To
be sure, the Court made clear that overinclusiveness does not automatically
doom a Section 5 measure. 148 However, in general, the greater the ratio of
statutory applications to actual constitutional violations proscribed, the more
cause for concern. 149 This theme echoes throughout the cases, each of which
145. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 639 (1999).
146. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673-75 (1999).
147. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 518 ("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall
within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional.").
149. See, e.g., id at 532 ("Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may
be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the
congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.").
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bemoaned the fact that the Section 5 measure under review swept far more
broadly than necessary to prevent or redress actual unconstitutional activity.
50
Indeed, one might capture this quantitative dimension of proportionality as
imposing a presumptive "less restrictive alternative" requirement.' 5'
The qualitative dimension focuses not on the scope of the measure's
coverage, but rather on the nature and severity of the burden the measure
imposes on the state wherever it applies. The more weighty or intrusive the
burden on the state, the less "proportional" the enforcement measure.
The Court balances these quantitative and qualitative concerns about the
scope and nature of the remedy against the magnitude of the wrong or evil
being addressed. This latter variable clearly has a quantitative dimension, since
the Court has repeatedly inquired whether a Section 5 measure "respond[s] to a
150. In Boerne, the Court complained that RFRA's "[s]weeping coverage...
prohibit[s] official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter," with
"no termination date or termination mechanism," 521 U.S. at 532, with the inevitable result
that "[i]n most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have
been motivated by religious bigotry." Id. at 535. In Florida Prepaid, the Court lamented
that "Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable
constitutional violations," 527 U.S. at 646, such that the Court could not conclude that many
of the regulated state actions "'have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional."' Id.
at 647 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). In Kimel, the Court concluded that the ADEA
"prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be
held unconstitutional under the [judicially] applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard." 528 U.S. 62, 64 (2000). In Morrison, while the Court primarily developed an
argument that the regulation of private conduct is ultra vires in the Section 5 context, the
Court did note that VAWA's remedy "applies uniformly throughout the Nation," even
though Congress (said the Court) did not find that discrimination against the victims of
gender-motivated crimes "exist[s] in all States, or even most States." 529 U.S. 598, 626
(2000). And in Garrett, the Court expressed the "same sort of concerns." 121 S. Ct. 955,
966 (2001).
Of course, at least in Boerne and Florida Prepaid, and perhaps Kimel and Garrett as
well, the apparent reason for the problematic overbreadth was that Congress believed it
could legitimately aim at a broader end, i.e., the range of state conduct that in its (but not, it
turns out, the Court's) judgment violated Section 1. Thus, it was the Court's narrower
reading of legitimate Section 5 ends that set up the tailoring problem in the first place.
151. At least two scholars have suggested that this specific concern about quantitative
overinclusion is better characterized as part of the "congruence" rather than
"proportionality" inquiry. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of
City of Boeme v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom
from State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LrrrLE RoCK L.J. 633, 641-42 (1998); Ira C.
Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflections on City of
Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 793, 815 (1998). As I mentioned earlier, it is
more important to understand precisely what the Court's test as a whole requires than to
worry about the peculiar meaning of each component-even assuming the Court itself ever
purported to define each term separately. I still prefer my characterization, however, not
only because I think it more accurately reflects the Court's apparent terminology, see
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (describing RFRA as "out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object" because of its "[s]weeping coverage" (emphasis added)), but also because
this interpretation makes it easier linguistically to trace the similarities and differences
between the Boerne and McCulloch means-ends standards.
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history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights.""'152
This seems to suggest that the more widespread the practice, the more
appropriate a Section 5 response. It is less clear whether this second variable
also has a qualitative component. The Court has not specifically explored this
question in the four decided cases. But the Court's statements that "[dfifficult
and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,' 153 and "'[s]trong
measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to
another, lesser one,' 1 54 imply that the Court would take into account certain
qualitative aspects of the harm being addressed. One might surmise, for
example, that an overinclusive and intrusive measure may be appropriate to
prevent unconstitutional state executions even if an equally overinclusive and
intrusive measure would not be appropriate to prevent minor deprivations of
property rights.
Having identified the various aspects of the Court's congruence and
proportionality test, we can now compare and contrast this multifaceted test
with McCulloch's traditional means-ends scrutiny. The Court's first inquiry in
the Section 5 context is whether a particular measure is conducive to preventing
or remedying a judicially defined Section 1 violation, in the sense that at least
some of the conduct it proscribes or redresses is actually unconstitutional. This
"congruence" requirement mimics the requirement that executory Article I
legislation be "proper," in the sense that such legislation must actually to some
degree execute or promote the function of a primary governmental power.
The Court's Section 5 proportionality inquiry, which assesses and balances
the magnitude of the remedy and the magnitude of the evil being addressed,
subsumes the "necessary" and "need" variables within the McCulloch rubric
developed above. In reverse order, the scope and nature of the evil being
addressed by Section 5 legislation correspond to the "need" for Article I
legislation. As explained above, this matter is not subject to meaningful
judicial scrutiny in the Article I context. 55
The overinclusive scope and magnitude of the burden imposed by Section
5 legislation can best be viewed as corresponding to the question of "necessity"
for Article I legislation. To be sure, Boerne and its progeny do not describe the
calibration between the scope/burden of a measure and the scope/seriousness of
the evil by asking whether the remedy is "necessary" to address the problem in
these precise words.156 But the nature of the inquiry is the same. By focusing
152. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
153. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 89 (emphasis added) (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530) (citation omitted).
155. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
156. With one exception: In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, Justice Scalia stated that because there was no deprivation of
property at issue, the Court need not pursue the follow-on question that City of Boerne would
otherwise require us to resolve:
whether the prophylactic measure taken under purported authority of § 5 (viz., prohibition of
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on the overinclusive and burdensome nature of a particular Section 5 measure,
the Court is essentially asking whether Congress could have adequately
addressed the identified evil through a remedy of lesser scope or duration,
and/or a less burdensome remedy. While using different words, this is the
same comparative inquiry that McCulloch describes as the test of necessity,
namely, whether the means Congress selected is necessary when compared to
other available alternatives that could secure the same end. And, as explained
above, in the McCulloch scheme the definition of necessity lies within
congressional discretion.'i 7
It is important to note that language in Boerne's progeny suggests that the
proportionality analysis applies, at least in full dress, only to "prophylactic"
Section 5 measures that are overinclusive in that they sweep into their
prohibitory scope some constitutional state conduct.158 By contrast, if a Section
States' sovereign-immunity claims, which are not in themselves a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment) was genuinely necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
527 U.S. at 675 (emphasis added). One might read Justice Scalia's dictum to suggest that,
even after the Court has concluded that a statutory obligation (such as the Lanham Act there
at issue) may be imposed on a state under Section 5, the Court will uphold the abrogation of
state sovereign immunity to enforce that obligation only if the abrogation is genuinely
necessary. See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE
DA~m L. REv. 859, 899 (2000) (suggesting that the dictum can be read this way). If so, I
believe the dictum reflects a category error. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), held
that states waived their sovereign immunity from suits seeking to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore Congress may abrogate such immunity through any valid Section
5 legislation so long as Congress makes its intent to do so "unmistakably clear," Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 44, 56 (1996). This is true without any separate requirement
that Congress demonstrate the "necessity" of abrogation. Indeed, given the Court's repeated
insistence that other remaining avenues of judicial enforcement provide ample means of
enforcing Section 1 restrictions on states, see, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 755-57 (1999), it is
unclear how Congress could ever make such a showing. Rather, under the Court's own
"congruence and proportionality" standard, the only question should be whether the
underlying obligations imposed on the states are necessary in the first place, thus rendering
the statute a valid exercise of Section 5 authority, and not an additional question regarding
the necessity of abrogation to enforce those obligations. To the extent an enigmatic
paragraph in Garrett suggests otherwise, see note 140 supra, it augers yet another
McCulloch-deviating move constraining congressional discretion.
157. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text. One might plausibly argue that
quantitative overinclusion could instead be captured by McCulloch's pretext analysis. See
notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text. If a particular congressional measure is
significantly broader than appears necessary to execute or service a primary power, one
might become suspicious that Congress is invoking the primary power as a pretext for acting
beyond its permissible domain. For example, if Congress purported to prohibit all state
criminal prosecutions ostensibly to ensure that no defendant is ever compelled to incriminate
himself, such radical overinclusion between means and ends might doom the statute under
McCulloch's pretext inquiry. But, as numerous cases have made clear over the past 180
years, pretext analysis is extremely deferential (where it occurs at all), and indeed it takes a
radical hypothetical like this one merely to frame the issue. Thus, whether Boerne's focus
on quantitative overinclusion is better viewed as an analog to McCulloch's necessity or
pretext inquiry, it certainly reflects a far more rigorous means-ends evaluation.
158. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 ("The legislative record thus suggests
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5 measure regulates only conduct judicially defined to violate the Constitution
and merely supplements the judicial remedies therefor,159 then Congress would
appear not to have to justify the measure with the same demonstration of
need.' 60
This parsing helps to lay bare Boerne's clear departure from McCulloch's
relaxed standard. While the latter defers substantially, if not completely, to
legislative judgments about need and necessity, the former applies rigorous
scrutiny of the same notions under the guise of "proportionality" review-
scrutiny rigorous enough to drive the invalidation of six purported Section 5
measures in the span of four years, either preventing Congress from abrogating
state sovereign immunity (as in Florida Prepaid, College Savings, Kimel, and
Garrett), or more broadly preventing Congress from regulating primary
conduct at all (as in Boerne and Morrison). Thus, the central question of this
article is squarely posed: What justifies the Court's decision to engage in
searching scrutiny of the proportionality of a Section 5 measure, even while it
defers entirely to Congress' judgments about the equivalent concepts of need
for and necessity of an Article I executory measure?
II. BOERNE'S DEVIATION FROM ORIGINAL INTENT AND UNDERSTANDING
REGARDING IEANS-ENDS TAILORING
In reaching its conclusion that Section 5 grants Congress remedial but not
substantive interpretive authority, the Court relied heavily on an originalist
methodology, canvassing the available statements of the relevant Framers and
also interpreting the drafting history of what eventually became Sections 1 and
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6' Whether one believes the Court executed
that the Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a history of 'widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights' of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper
prophylactic § 5 legislation.") (emphasis added) (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526);
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625 (2000) ("as we have phrased it in more recent cases,
prophylactic legislation under § 5 must" satisfy congruence and proportionality) (emphasis
added); Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963 (2001) ("Accordingly, § 5 legislation reaching beyond
the scope of § 1's actual guarantees must exhibit" congruence and proportionality)
(emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (proscribing and providing remedies for, inter
alia, state action that violates the federal Constitution).
160. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of
Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1331 (2001). I say that proportionality analysis
would not apply "in full dress," however, because one must wonder whether the Court would
still consider relevant the nature and severity of the legislative burden, notwithstanding right-
remedy correspondence. For example, the Court might express some concern under the
proportionality test if confronted by a Section 5 statute making it a crime punishable by a
mandatory 20-year prison term for a state law enforcement officer to conduct a pat-down
search that violates the Fourth Amendment by exceeding a valid Terry-stop. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (outlining the conditions considered reasonable for an officer to
stop and search a suspect).
161. See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
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this task well, 162 the Court's methodological approach to the question of ends
renders inexplicable its failure to engage in a similar originalist inquiry before
articulating the "congruence and proportionality" constraint on Section 5
means. And, an originalist inquiry-whether focused on the Framers' actual
subjective intentions, as the Court did with respect to the interpretation of
Section 5 ends, or whether focused on the most likely public understanding of
the amendment's plain language, as many contemporary originalists would
do' 63-firmly supports the conclusion that Section 5 was designed and
understood to impose a means-ends tailoring test that mimicked the test applied
to Article I executory statutes. Indeed, the replacement of Article I's
"necessary and proper" formulation with Section 5's "appropriate" standard is
best understood as codifying Chief Justice Marshall's especially deferential
gloss on the former language in McCulloch.
To begin with, the framing history of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clauses reveals that the same Framers whose
intentions the Court canvassed regarding legislative ends appear uniformly to
have embraced the McCulloch standard when discussing the tailoring
requirement for legislative means. The drafters of Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment did not clearly explain their decision to employ the term
"appropriate" rather than "necessary and proper" when proposing Section 2.
Their debates clearly indicate, however, that "appropriate" was selected with
the McCulloch standard in mind.1
64
162. Trenchant criticism of the Court's originalist analysis is offered by several
authors. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 26, at 122-52; McConnell, supra note 26, at 174-83.
But see Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv.
81, 82-100 (interpreting history of Fourteenth Amendment to support the conclusion that
Boerne later reached).
163. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. REv. 611
(1999) (distinguishing between the methodologies of "original intent" and "original
meaning," the former focusing on the subjective intentions of the relevant Framers and the
latter focusing on the objective original meaning that a reasonable listener would place on
the words used in the Constitution at the time of a provision's enactment).
164. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Wilson) (equating "appropriate" with "necessary and proper," and noting "[o]f the necessity
of the measure Congress is the sole judge") (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)); id. (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) (explaining that the relevant
question concerning scope of Section 2 power is whether a particular measure "can be said
to come within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in innumerable cases [meaning
McCulloch and its progeny], that in order to entitle this Government to assume a power as an
implied power of this Government it 'must appear that it is appropriate and plainly adapted
to the end"') (quoting STORY, supra note 51, at 416); Burt, supra note 162, at 93 n.44 ("In
1871, debating the Ku Klux Klan Act, [Representative] Bingham insisted the two
formulations ["necessary and proper" and "appropriate"] were identical."). The Supreme
Court itself has linked together the Section 2 enforcement power with the McCulloch
standard. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (explaining that
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment "clothes Congress with power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States") (emphasis added); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (same).
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To be sure, the drafters of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment initially
did employ the "necessary and proper" formulation.1 5 This phrasing was later
replaced with the "appropriate" formulation when the Framers changed the
entire structure of the amendment to provide a primary judicial role in
enforcing Section l's guarantees. But there is no hint in the legislative record,
nor logical implication from the structural change, suggesting that the Framers
intended this terminological shift to ratchet up the required means-ends
nexus. 16 Indeed, nowhere in the legislative history is any means-ends standard
other than McCulloch mentioned, let alone endorsed. And just two years after
Section 5's adoption, the Supreme Court once again equated "necessary and
proper" with "appropriate," proclaiming
[i]t must be taken then as finally settled, so far as judicial decisions can settle
anything, that the words 'all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution' powers expressly granted or vested, have, in the Constitution, a
sense equivalent to that of the words, laws, not absolutely necessary indeed,
but appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional and legitimate ends; laws
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution;
laws really calculated to effect objects intrusted to the government. 67
Moreover, the plain language chosen by the Framers is best understood as
165. As the Court observed in Boerne, Representative John Bingham's initial draft of
the proposed amendment stated that:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty,
and property.
521 U.S. at 520 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
166. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.9 (describing this drafting
revision and explaining that the revision "was never thought to have the effect of
diminishing the scope of this congressional power"); TENBROEK, THE ANTi-SLAVERY
ORIGINS OF TrE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 187-90 (1951) (same); McConnell, supra note 26,
at 178 (asserting that the shift from "necessary and proper" to "appropriate" was a "mere
change[] in nomenclature, with no substantive significance"); see also 2 CONG. REC. 414
(1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) ("The power to secure equal civil rights by 'appropriate
legislation' is an express power; and Congress, therefore, is the exclusive judge of the proper
means to employ. This has been settled in McCulloch vs. Maryland."); id. at 4085-86
(statement of Sen. Thurman) ("'[B]y appropriate legislation,' means nothing more in respect
to the amendments to which it is attached, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth, than does
the last clause in the eighth section of the first article [i.e., the Necessary and Proper
Clause]."); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 83 (statement of Rep. Bingham, the
principal drafter of the language that became the Fourteenth Amendment) ("The power to
enforce this provision [the Fourteenth Amendment] by law is as full as any other grant of
power to Congress."); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 586 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Donnelly) (construing Bingham's proposed "necessary and proper" language as providing
"in effect that Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation all the
guarantees of the Constitution").
167. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 615 (1870) (emphasis added); see
also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
"clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery in the United States.").
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emphasizing the deference to be accorded congressional enforcement choices,
by specifically eschewing any independent constitutional assessment of the
"necessity" of particular congressional means. Direct comparison of the
language of the Necessary and Proper Clause and Section 5 reveals an obvious
similarity and an equally obvious difference: Section 5 repeats the requirement
of propriety but omits the requirement of necessity.
The terms "proper" in Article I and "appropriate" in Section 5 (and the
other similarly worded Enforcement Clauses) are etymologically linked, and as
a linguistic matter it is difficult to deny their equivalent meaning in this context.
Chief Justice Marshall used the terms interchangeably in McCulloch, for
example, using the phrase "means which are appropriate" to capture the
requirement that executory means be "proper."'' 6  One would thus be hard-
pressed to ground a more stringent means-ends nexus in the term "appropriate"
than in "proper."
Indeed, the term "necessary" is notable by its absence in Section 5. A
reader of the text would naturally conclude, absent compelling nontextual
evidence to the contrary, that Section 5 did not incorporate a necessity test into
its means-ends nexus requirement. And this conclusion would be fully
consistent with the Framers' understanding since, given McCulloch's canonical
status, the term "necessary" had long since ceased to be viewed-if it ever
was-as imposing a meaningful independent constraint on Congress' choice of
means to implement permissible ends. Recall that, while McCulloch made it
clear that courts must review congressional choices to ensure they are
"appropriate" in the sense of being "plainly adapted to" a legitimate end, 69
McCulloch (and Fisher even before that170) made it just as clear that courts
should not second-guess Congress' judgment as to the "necessity" of
congressional legislation. 71
Thus the plain language of Section 5, coupled with the Framers' specific
168. See note 47 supra; see also, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,
539, 542, 543 (1870) (describing and applying McCulloch's test for "necessary and proper"
authority by using the term "appropriate" and "appropriateness" to describe the notion of
proper); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (affirming
Congress' power to control intrastate transactions "as is necessary and appropriate to make
the regulation of the interstate commerce effective") (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423 (equating "being an appropriate measure"
with being "really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government").
170. See note 45 supra.
171. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text. McCulloch's deferential treatment
of the "necessary" criterion was clearly familiar to the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers.
See also, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1124 (statement of Rep. Cook) (noting
that "Congress should be the judge of what is necessary for the purpose of securing to [freed
slaves] those rights" when construing the scope of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment);
id. at 1836 (statement of Rep. Lawrence) ("If a certain means to carry into effect any of the
powers expressly given by the Constitution to the Government of the Union be an
appropriate measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of necessity is a question
of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance.").
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endorsement of the McCulloch standard, powerfully dictates the conclusion that
"appropriate legislation" means nothing more than legislation that is "plainly
adapted" or "conducive to" or "really calculated to" enforcing Fourteenth
Amendment provisions. Section 5 does not impose a judicially enforceable
requirement that Congress' choice of means to enforce these provisions satisfy
any particular standard of "necessity" as compared with alternative means. Nor
does "appropriate legislation," any more than "necessary and proper" laws,
invite any judicial inquiry into the need for Congress to address the identified
evil or strive to promote the identified good in the first place. 172 In other words,
using the Court's Boerne terminology (at least as I have clarified it), the plain
language and original understanding of Section 5 impose on enforcement
measures a requirement of "congruence," but eschew any judicially enforceable
requirement of "proportionality."
Of course, even if one downplays the emendation of "necessary" from the
conventional formulation and views the term "appropriate" as a synonym for
both components of the phrase "necessary and proper," it is still the case that
the phrase, as understood by the Fourteenth Amendment Framers operating on
a post-McCulloch legal landscape, captured only the concept of "congruence"
and not "proportionality," since the issues of necessity and need were left to
congressional discretion.
This plain language interpretation is buttressed by further evidence of the
Fourteenth Amendment Framers' contemporaneous understanding of the
breadth and significance of Section 5's grant of power. First, it is quite telling
that no participant in the debates over the Reconstruction Amendments'
Enforcement Clauses proffered and defended any alternative standard for
defining the scope of Congress' enforcement power; incorporation of
McCulloch's liberal means-ends standard was either expressly invoked or
implicitly assumed. 173 For a Court willing (at times) to view the Framers'
silence on a particular issue as strong evidence of a specific intent to endorse
prior understandings, 74 here the silence is deafening.
Second, the deeds of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers, the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, reveal the breadth of the prevailing understanding of
"appropriate" legislation. The Framers clearly had a capacious view of
congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment because they
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 75 which "swept far beyond merely
prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude.' ' 76 As the Supreme Court has
172. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
173. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
174. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741-43 (1999) (stating that Framers' silence as
to states' immunity from private suit in state court is best explained by the assumption that
no one even considered the possibility that such immunity would be stripped).
175. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
176. Amar, supra note 26, at 823; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 439-40 (1968) (noting that the leaders of Congress who had authored the Thirteenth
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put it, "[w]hether or not" Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment "did any
more than" abolish slavery, "it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of that
Amendment empowered Congress to do much more."177 This understanding of
"appropriate legislation" as operationalized in Thirteenth Amendment practice
prevailed while the Thirty-Ninth Congress drafted the parallel Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Third, both by word and deed the Fourteenth Amendment Framers made
clear their desire not to vest the judiciary with exclusive or even primary
jurisdiction with respect to safeguarding Section 1 rights. Republican leaders
of Congress criticized the Supreme Court's recent decisions indicating a lack of
sympathy with the basic normative vision of the Reconstruction Amendments,
such as Dred Scott v. Sandford17 and Ex parte Milligan.179 Thus, "Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment was born of the fear that the judiciary would
frustrate Reconstruction by a narrow interpretation of congressional power."'10
At the same time, members of Congress reflected this fear by proposing
(though never enacting, apparently because of doubts as to Congress' power to
do so) various supermajority requirements on Supreme Court adjudication to
protect federal legislation-and even the Fourteenth Amendment itself-from
judicial invalidation. 8' Such contemporaneous evidence of the Section 5
Framers' attitude towards judicial protection of Section 1 rights confirms the
Amendment "had no doubt that its Enabling Clause contemplated the sort of positive
legislation that was embodied in the 1866 Civil Rights Act").
177. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
178. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
179. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 483
(1868) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (denouncing Dred Scott); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1484 (1867) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (denouncing Exparte Milligan).
180. McConnell, supra note 26, at 182.
181. See, e.g., H.R. 1015, quoted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 616 (1867)
("[N]o judgment shall be rendered or decision made [by the Supreme Court] against the
validity of any statute, or of any authority exercised by the United States, except with the
concurrence of all the judges of the said court."); S. 163, quoted in CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 503-04 (1868) (No Supreme Court case involving "the action or effect of
any law of the United States shall be decided adversely to the validity of such law without
the concurrence of two thirds of all the members of said court in the decision .. "); H.R.
30, reported in CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 473 (1868) ("requiring the concurrence
of two thirds of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States in order to pronounce a
law passed by Congress to be unconstitutional"); H.R. 379, reported in CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 668 (1868) (same).
Representative Bingham specifically supported a two-thirds supermajority requirement
in part to protect the Fourteenth Amendment itself from attack based on the disputed validity
of its ratification procedures:
This great and victorious people, we are told, cannot amend their own Constitution without
the concurrence of some, at least, of the disorganized communities who but yesterday rushed
into war with arms in their hands and attempted to batter down the holy temple of our
liberties. I desire this law to be passed so that the question shall only be touched, if at all, by
the consenting voice of two thirds of the judges of that court; and then, if they dare to do it,
let an appeal again be taken from their atrocious decision to the people.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 484 (1868).
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Framers' intention, reflected in the plain language of the Enforcement Clause,
to provide Congress with capacious authority to enforce those rights itself.
One further point bears mention. The Framers' equation of "appropriate"
with McCulloch's conventional means-ends standard can be further bolstered
by considering an interesting, if ultimately flawed, structural argument focusing
on the relationship between the Necessary and Proper Clause and all other
congressional powers. Recall that this Clause structurally operates to
supplement each of Congress' enumerated and other primary powers, as well as
each of the powers vested in the executive and judicial branches of
government. Section 5 expands the scope of Congress' enumerated powers, by
adding the power (as defined in Boerne) to enforce, inter alia, court-defined
Section 1 rights. Just as the Necessary and Proper Clause supplements each of
the specific grants of power enumerated in Article I, such as the power to "raise
and support Armies," so too, it would seem as a matter of constitutional
structure, the Necessary and Proper Clause supplements the enumerated
Section 5 power (as well as all of the other enumerated Enforcement Clauses
sprinkled throughout the Constitution's amendments). Just as Congress can
both "raise Armies" and enact executory laws it deems necessary and proper
(assessed under McCulloch) to achieve that end, Congress can both "enforce"
judicially defined rights against states and enact executory laws it deems
necessary and proper (again assessed under McCulloch) to achieve that end. In
other words, the argument would run, the same "bubble" of incidental powers
surrounding each Article I enumerated power should also surround each
enumerated Enforcement Clause power. According to this argument, at the end
of the day the McCulloch standard still governs Congress' ability to restrict
state violations of judicially defined rights, even if only through the confluence
of Section 5 and the Necessary and Proper Clause, rather than through the
former clause by itself.
The proper response, I think, is that this structural argument is too clever
by half. Section 5 is of course an enumerated power, but unlike those
enumerated in Article I (other than the Necessary and Proper Clause) this
power is itself an executory power of sorts. Section 5 does not simply declare
that Congress has the power to enforce Section 1, but says more specifically
that Congress may do so "by appropriate legislation." Thus unlike, say, the
Commerce Clause, Section 5 contains its own built-in standard for defining
permissible executory legislative actions. As a result, the specific standard of
"appropriate" legislation in Section 5 is better viewed as supplanting the
conventional McCulloch authority for implied executory legislation, rather than
being supplemented by it. Put differently, the "by appropriate legislation"
language overrides or impliedly repeals the erstwhile applicability of the
Necessary and Proper Clause as a supplement to Section 5's enumerated
authority; to view it otherwise is to double-count the scope of permissible
means-ends reasoning.
But this insight, while responsive to the structural argument outlined
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above, provides additional reason to reject the Court's position that the standard
for Section 5 "appropriate" legislation is more restrictive than the standard for
Article I "necessary and proper" legislation. It is one thing to understand
Section 5's reference to "appropriate" as supplanting, essentially through an
implied repeal, the erstwhile applicability of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
But given the presumption against implied repeals, it is quite another thing to
assume-without any basis in text or legislative history-that the new test of
"appropriate" was intended to replace the McCulloch standard with a stricter
means-ends test. Of course, it is logically possible for a later-adopted narrow
rule to repeal impliedly an earlier-adopted broad rule. But it seems especially
unlikely in this context; had the Framers intended to replace a longstanding rule
of broad congressional authority with a narrower new standard, one would
expect that there would be at least a hint of such an intent in the legislative
debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. But there is none; the only
discussions of the scope of Congress' enforcement authority explicitly invoked
or intentionally mimicked the conventional McCulloch standard.1 12 Thus, the
recognition that Section 5 impliedly repealed the erstwhile applicability of the
Necessary and Proper Clause as a structural matter makes it all the more
difficult to argue that Section 5 was originally intended or understood to retreat
from, rather than embrace, the "hitherto universally accepted" standard for
means-ends review. 13
It therefore appears clear that the Court's announced congruence and
proportionality standard decisively breaks from the best textual and originalist
understanding of the Enforcement Clause. Given the Court's professed
reliance on text and the Framers' original intent regarding the scope of
legitimate ends, the Court's refusal to engage in serious textual interpretation or
to explore the Framers' original intent regarding the scope of legitimate means
renders its conclusion all the more suspect. Moreover, given the textual and
historical support for McCulloch-style means-ends scrutiny of Section 5
measures, the separation of powers and federalism arguments that purportedly
support the heightened congruence and proportionality test bear a heavy burden
of persuasion. Let us now consider whether they can meet this burden.
182. See notes 165-167 supra and accompanying text.
183. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 539 (1870) (explaining that the
"rules of construction" for assessing the scope of Congress' "discretion with respect to the
means by which the powers [the Constitution] confers are to be carried into execution" were
"settled at an early period in the history of the government, hitherto universally accepted,
and not even now doubted"); see also Edward Hartnett, A "Uniform and Entire"
Constitution; or, What if Madison had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 269-70, 275-76
(1998) (stating that had the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments been interwoven into the
original constitutional text rather than appended to it as stand-alone provisions, the
Enforcement Clauses would have been included merely by adding to the end of the existing
Necessary and Proper Clause the phrase "and to enforce the limitations and obligations
imposed by this Constitution").
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1I. BOERNE'S REVISIONISM: CAN HEIGHTENED MEANS-ENDS SCRUTINY FOR
SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT MEASURES BE JUSTIFIED?
While in Boerne the Court offered some reasons for concluding that
Congress can enforce only judicially defined as opposed to congressionally
defined rights, the Court offered little justification for imposing the
"congruence and proportionality" restriction on Congress' choice of means.
The Court said no more than that this restriction serves to distinguish between
enforcement measures that are truly remedial (and hence serve the legitimate
ends of protecting court-defined Section 1 rights) and those that are
impermissibly substantive (because necessarily predicated upon protecting a
congressionally defined right).1 14 I consider here several possible rationales for
this heightened means-ends scrutiny: concerns about pretextual legislation,
various separation of powers concerns, and various federalism concerns. In the
end, none of these rationales fully supports the Court's sharp break from its
longstanding employment of the more deferential McCulloch standard.
A. A Concern for Pretextual Exercises of Congressional Authority
Various scholars have suggested that this heightened means-ends nexus
requirement might be described as ferreting out the "pretextual" use of Section
5. In other words, the test is designed to prevent Congress from justifying
legislation as a remedial measure when Congress is "really" trying to impose its
own definition of privileges or immunities, due process, or equal protection
rights on the states." 5
One might initially ask whether such a "pretext" analysis is properly
applied to Section 5, since the Court does not similarly scrutinize the motives
underlying any particular exercise of most other enumerated powers. 1 6 But if
184. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
185. See, e.g., Doff & Friedman, supra note 26 (arguing that congruence and
proportionality test is "[the mechanism the Boerne Court chose for discerning bona fide
remedial measures from impermissible efforts to ratchet up substantive constitutional
protection"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REv. 54, 131-32 (1997) (treating Boerne's
Section 5 analysis as resting on a "purpose" test); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance
and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on "Proportionality,"
Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 628 (2000) ("A disproportional law may
be a law not really designed for one asserted purpose but to sweep more broadly or in other
directions. In this sense, Flores's proportionality test may be a reinvigoration of the
'legitimate end' test of McCulloch v. Maryland, through a mechanism perhaps less difficult
to administer, in light of the challenges of identifying a collective legislative intent and the
reluctance of courts to attribute improper motives to a coordinate branch of government.")
(footnotes omitted).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) ("The motive and
purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon
the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are
given no control.").
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Section 5 is viewed as a power that, like the Necessary and Proper Clause, is
intrinsically "telic" in nature in that the power is authorized only insofar as it is
directed toward an identified constitutional end, then a pretext inquiry seems
appropriate. 87 Indeed, McCulloch itself suggested that courts should scrutinize
Congress' executory laws to ensure they are truly designed to serve legitimate
ends, rather than being pretextual exercises of a forbidden police power. 8
Thus, as Professor Vicki Jackson has observed, the congruence and
proportionality test might be viewed as "a sub silentio reinvigoration of the
'pretext' line of McCulloch stemming from a perception that Congress behaves
in 'pretextual' ways too much of the time." '189
However, as Professor Jackson's carefully chosen word "reinvigoration"
implies, since McCulloch the courts have eschewed any meaningful role in
policing this boundary by asking whether particular exercises of the Necessary
and Proper Clause are really pretexts to assert a forbidden general police
power.' 90 Rather, courts defer substantially to congressional judgment in the
Article I context.
The Court's apparent reinvigoration of pretextual analysis in Boerne and its
progeny raises two related questions. First, what constitutional values are at
stake, such that the fear that Congress might stretch beyond the limits of its
constitutional authority by using granted powers beyond their limited purposes
justifies heightened judicial scrutiny to ferret out such statutes? Is it because
the motives underlying pretextual statutes are constitutionally troublesome per
se, or because the effects of such extended congressional authority contravene
federalism values? Second, why should there be more rigorous scrutiny for
pretextual exercises of Section 5 than for pretextual exercises of the Necessary
and Proper Clause?
Absent a normative answer to these questions, the claim that the
congruence and proportionality test is designed to ferret out pretextual
exercises of Section 5 power remains purely descriptive. In other words, even
if a desire to screen out pretextual uses of Congress' Section 5 power explains
187. Professor Laurence Tribe suggests that congressional motive may be relevant for
assessing the limits of congressional power under any grant of authority "that contains its
own statement of the purposes for which it may be invoked," and he lists as examples the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Reconstruction era Enforcement Clauses, and the clause
empowering Congress to provide for patents and copyrights "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 1 TRmE, supra note 28, at 803 n.12.
I am unsure whether text alone is sufficient to distinguish between these so-called purpose-
specific clauses and those treated as "plenary" and hence not subject to motive scrutiny (such
as the power "to regulate Commerce" in various contexts, which could plausibly be read to
contain a notion of commercial purpose). But the context as well as text of the Necessary
and Proper Clause and Enforcement Clauses reveals their telic nature.
188. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
189. Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the
Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERs L. J. 691, 720 (2000).
190. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
1167May 2001]
HeinOnline  -- 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1167 2000-2001
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
the Court's insistence on a carefully tailored means-ends nexus, the question
remains what justifies this insistence uniquely in the Section 5 context.191 We
must therefore consider and evaluate plausible justificatory arguments for this
unique concern.
B. Separation of Powers Justifications for Heightened Means-Ends Scrutiny
The Court's only express justification for requiring "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end" was that "[]acking such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect."' 92 And "substantive" legislation is
unacceptable because the Court, and not Congress, has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States: "If
Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means." 1 93  The stated rationale for heightened
means-ends scrutiny, therefore, apparently is to preserve judicial authority over
constitutional interpretation.
Unfortunately, assessing whether the Court's separation of powers concern
justifies a heightened means-ends tailoring requirement for Section 5
measures-and only Section 5 measures-is rendered difficult by the fact that
the Court never explains what, precisely, is wrong with so-called substantive
congressional enforcement measures. Even an exercise of what the Court
would call substantive Section 5 authority would not change the Constitution in
a conceptual sense, nor would it directly change what the Constitution means to
the Court. So what drives the Court's apparent concern for preserving its
authority to dictate "[t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning"? 194 What does the Court think
is truly at stake? 195
191. A second question lurks here: Even if the Court can justify a special focus on
pretext in the Section 5 context, is the heightened tailoring requirement an appropriate
mechanism for detecting pretextual legislation? Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel
suggest that "the criteria of congruence and proportionality seem an odd and awkward way"
to discern legislative intent. "[A] court that wishes to discover congressional purpose is
perfectly capable of asking the question directly and simply." Post & Siegel, supra note 26,
at 510-11. In my view, however, even if the question of congressional motive can
sometimes be answered with a more direct exploration of, inter alia, a statute's legislative
history, there is nothing odd about supplementing such an inquiry with a means-ends test.
192. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
193. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
194. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
195. The Court does not suggest and cannot mean that Congress can never exercise
any of its legislative powers based on an interpretation of the Constitution that diverges from
the Court's. So long as Congress does not take or authorize governmental action that is itself
prohibited by the Constitution, Congress can and frequently does legislate--or choose not to
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1. Judicial control over the implementation of constitutional norms.
One possibility is that the Court really cares about ensuring its ultimate
control over the actual implementation of constitutional norms. 196 The Court
did declare in Kimel that the congruence and proportionality test is designed to
ensure that the "ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial
Branch."' 97 Perhaps the Court's premise is that, as a matter of institutional
responsibility, it is the Court and not Congress which is responsible for
determining the extent to which legal norms-both those granting government
powers and those restricting the same-are articulated and operationalized in
the name of the Constitution. In the Section 5 context, in other words, the
Court wants to ensure that Fourteenth Amendment rights do not, in practice,
become something other than what the Court says they should be.
If this type of concern is the driving force behind the Court's desire to rein
in Congress, it is subject to challenge on both intrinsic and extrinsic grounds.
First, the Court's position can be criticized as insufficiently sensitive to the
distinctive institutional factors that shape and sometimes constrain the Court's
and Congress' ability to draft enforceable doctrines protecting constitutional
rights. Second, even if the Court's position is intrinsically sound, it is difficult
to explain why the argument should apply uniquely to constrain Congress'
Section 5 authority, and not also Congress' authority to enact necessary and
proper Article I legislation. I consider these criticisms in turn.
a. The institutionalist critique.
Various scholars have persuasively argued that sometimes there is a
divergence between the "Constitution-as-applied-by-courts and the
Constitution-in-the-abstract," 198 or at least between the former and the
legislate-based on its own interpretation of constitutional norms. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at
535 ("When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the
right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the
Constitution."). The Court's argument in Boerne is a narrower one: For purposes of
determining the outer reach of Section 5 authority, the Court and not Congress is the final
arbiter of the meaning of Section l's provisions.
196. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 151, at 812 ("Moreover, a broad reading of Section
5-the type of reading suggested by McCulloch, representing maximum elasticity of implied
power-is in stark tension with the Court's Marbury function. When Congress legislates
broadly to prevent what it perceives as violations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it strikes at the Court's dominance in law declaration ... .
197. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added).
198. McConnell, supra note 26, at 189; see, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. Rnv. 1212, 1213-20
(1978). For criticism of this way of characterizing the relationship between rights and
judicial doctrine, see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
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Constitution as construed by someone "not subject to the same institutional
constraints as courts." 199  Such a gap calls into question the Court's
unwillingness to view Congress as a partner rather than competitor in the
project of constitutional interpretation. Suppose a particular Section 5 measure
is designed to secure a right defined somewhat more broadly than the Court
defines it, and yet the Court's own doctrinal definition of the right reflects not
the right in its "true abstract" form but rather is somewhat truncated because of
institutional factors constraining its interpretive function. Then, so the
argument goes, the congressional measure might be seen as fully consistent
with judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation because the measure
actually fleshes out the right's actual protection in a manner that better matches
the Court's own unconstrained vision of what the right should mean. The
scholars developing this critique have generally argued that the Court should
employ a more capacious definition of legitimate Section 5 ends (so as to
include enforcing the "true" as opposed to truncated judicial protection for a
Section 1 right). But the same line of reasoning could be deployed to argue that
the Court should not employ a means-ends tailoring requirement that is so
rigorous that it precludes Congress from compensating for judicial
underprotection of abstract rights.
Scholars have focused upon two different sorts of institutional constraints
that sometimes lead courts to develop judicial doctrines that, viewed from a
less institutionally constrained perspective, underenforce particular
constitutional rights. The first sort of constraint arises from the need of courts
to implement rights through workable doctrines: based on institutional and
sometimes empirical considerations, courts must translate abstract norms or
rights into specific and elaborate legal doctrines useful for resolving concrete
cases. Courts generally bring constitutional norms to life by employing one of
various types of doctrinal tests, for example, per se rules, balancing tests, and
purpose rules,200 and those tests may "identify as unconstitutional only a subset
of legislative actions which contravene the norm motivating the doctrine." 20'
The second sort of constraint arises from judicial fealty to structural
separation of powers principles, including the presumption of constitutionality
properly accorded to the actions of coordinate branches and the presumptive
caution properly exercised by life-tenured judges in evaluating the actions of
more democratically accountable actors. To the extent judges take these
structural norms into account in determining the scope of judicially defined
rights, "it follows that there will be cases in which judicial interpretations of the
Constitution will differ from the way those judges would interpret the
199. Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 467.
200. See Fallon, supra note 185, at 75-106 (describing eight such doctrinal tests).
201. Evan H. Caminker, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes,
95 YALE L.J. 1185, 1192 (1986); see Fallon, supra note 185, at 66 (same).
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Constitution independently of institutional restraints." 202
Thus, both because of the demands of doctrine-formation and because of
separation of powers principles urging judicial caution in invalidating
governmental action, there is some inevitable underenforcement of
constitutional rights as viewed from even the courts' own "purist" or
unconstrained perspective. According to the institutionalist critique, it would
be fully consistent with the Court's proclaimed desire to maintain its
interpretive supremacy for it to uphold Section 5 measures that are predicated
on legislative interpretations of Section 1 rights that more closely approximate
the Court's purist views than do its articulated doctrinal contours. 2 3 The
Court's unwillingness to consider this possibility thus proves counterproductive
to its own presumed objective.
While scholars have generally focused on the presence of this gap between
abstract and judicially protected rights, Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel
have recently evaluated this gap from a more dynamic, diachronic perspective.
They argue that, at least in the specific context of equal protection norms, the
Court's stingy approach to Congress' enforcement discretion might undermine
the Court's ability to implement its own vision of constitutional rights over the
span of time. After carefully detailing and evaluating the history of civil rights
adjudication and legislation beginning with Brown v. Board of Education2° and
extending throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Post and Siegel
202. McConnell, supra note 26, at 189; see id. ("The restrained judge will give elected
officials the benefit of the doubt with respect to governmental purpose, will assume facts
favorable to the government in assessing effect, will seek to avoid gratuitous conflict with
legislative authority, and will accept reasonable interpretations of the Constitution that
support legislative action.").
203. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 26, at 156 (explaining that unlike courts,
"Congress need not be concerned that its interpretations of the Bill of Rights will trench
upon democratic prerogatives, because its actions are the expression of the democratic will
of the people") (emphasis added); Sager, supra note 198, at 1239 ("If the federal judiciary is
constrained by institutional concerns from exhausting the concept of [a constitutional right],
congressional attempts pursuant to Section 5 to enlarge upon the judiciary's limited construct
do no violence to the general notion that the federal judiciary's readings of the Constitution
are dispositive within our system.").
In Garrett, Justice Breyer's dissent advanced such an argument in response to the
Court's objection that Congress' attempt in the ADA to require state employers to justify
refusals to accommodate persons with disabilities deviated from the Constitution's
requirement that the employee "negate reasonable bases for the employer's decision," 121 S.
Ct. 955, 967 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that: "The problem with
the Court's approach is that neither the 'burden of proof' that favors States nor any other rule
of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its § 5 power.
'Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process.., have no application to
Congress."' Id. at 972 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 248 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). See also id. at 973 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to the
exercise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a court's institutional
limitations."). The Court did not respond to the dissent's argument.
204. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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conclude that the Court relied on Congress as a necessary partner in actualizing
into institutional life the Court's own initial or evolved interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
This is so for two reasons. The first is that congressional action supporting
judicial norms over a sustained period of time is sometimes necessary to
undermine the force of the institutional constraints that can create a static right-
doctrine gap. This is exemplified by the evolution of judicially enforced
equality norms as applied to race discrimination:
Nothing better illustrates this than Brown itself. Brown forced the nation to
confront a new and compelling vision of equal citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court, acting by itself, was unable to bring
the nation to embrace the commitments it had expressed in Brown. As Judge
Wisdom famously observed, "[t]he courts acting alone have failed." It was
only with the intervention of Congress and the Executive Branch in 1964 that
the vision announced in Brown began to become a living constitutional
reality.205
As Post and Siegel demonstrate, for example, Congress' enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964206 provided needed institutional and popular support for the
Court's vision of equality so as to impress, over time, the Court's vision firmly
into law. Thus, "the Court will sometimes require the assistance of Congress to
succeed in the very task of constitutional interpretation that Boerne seeks to
safeguard." 207
The second reason is that sometimes the Court's own ultimate crafting of
equal protection doctrine has been heavily influenced by congressional statutes
that, when first enacted, might well have extended beyond the Court's own
concurrent vision of equality. In certain contexts, "Congress, as a popular
legislative body, is well situated to perceive and express evolving cultural
norms," and therefore "Congress' understanding of equality is a vital resource
for the Court to consider as it interprets the Equal Protection Clause." 208 While
to some degree the evolution of racial equality norms reflects this phenomenon
as well, this second point is perhaps more clearly exemplified by the evolution
of judicially enforced equality norms as applied to sex discrimination. As Post
and Siegel explain, the Court did not hold facial sex-based classifications to
trigger heightened judicial scrutiny until the 1970s, after the growth of the
feminist movement and congressional enactment of legislation prohibiting sex
discrimination in the workplace.209 And the plurality opinion in the pivotal case
205. Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 515 (quoting United States v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1967)).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
207. Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 519.
208. Id. at 520.
209. Id. at 520-21.
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Frontiero v. Richardson2 10 frankly acknowledged how congressional action had
influenced the Justices' evolving approach to sex discrimination .2  Recent
history thus reveals that sometimes congressional enforcement of equality
norms prompts a learning experience for the Court, such that unduly fettering
Congress through heightened Section 5 scrutiny might preclude the Court from
learning from and perhaps later incorporating norms that can only be perceived,
appreciated and developed by a popularly accountable institution.
For both of these reasons, Post and Siegel warn, Boerne's heightened
means-ends scrutiny could prove counterproductive for the Court's own
purposes. If the institutional disparities of perspective and approach between
the Court and Congress
are spumed and discarded in the name of maintaining ultimate judicial control
over the meaning of the Constitution, the Court risks failing to make its own
constitutional vision 'more firmly law.' In such circumstances, to read the
Boerne test to require a strict form of narrow tailoring would be actually to
endanger the Court's own interpretive authority.212
Thus, the authors conclude, in the equal protection and other similar contexts
the Court should display a greater willingness to uphold Section 5 measures
predicated on somewhat broader definitions of Section 1 rights than the Court
has previously or would contemporaneously articulate.
Both the static and dynamic accounts of a gap between abstract rights and
judicial doctrine concretizing those rights are compelling, and I agree that this
gap ought self-consciously to inform various aspects of judicial
decisionmaking. 13 And while I am quite sympathetic to the challenge to
Boerne based on this gap, I think it appropriate to sound a note of caution.
Before acting on this trenchant criticism, one must at least consider the
possibility that ceding to Congress a meaningful role in the development of
constitutional norms through Section 5 might in certain contexts constrain
rather than expand the operational reach of rights.
Viewed in a static sense, judicial doctrine sometimes overenforces rather
than underenforces the "pure" scope of a right, because the requirement that
courts devise workable doctrines to decide concrete cases sometimes leads the
Court to deploy doctrines such as bright-line rules that proscribe more conduct
than that which actually contravenes the norm in question.2 4 Perhaps the most
prominent of many examples of such overenforcement is Miranda v.
210. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
211. Id. at 687-88.
212. Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 519; see also id. at 522 ("In fact, history suggests
that there are circumstances in which imposing such [means-ends] restrictions might well
diminish, rather than enhance, the Court's authority in interpreting the Constitution.").
213. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 201, at 1202-09 (courts ought to take this gap into
account when fashioning remedies for unconstitutional statutes).
214. See Fallon, supra note 185, at 65 ("[Clonstitutional tests frequently either
overenforce or underenforce constitutional norms .... ) (emphasis added).
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Arizona.2 1 5  The Court has long interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause (and the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation thereof)
to preclude the use in a criminal case of a defendant's inculpatory statements
that were not truly voluntary because they were obtained through
compulsion.2 6 Miranda held that the Fifth Amendment additionally requires
that statements produced through custodial interrogation be suppressed from
the prosecution's case-in-chief absent the provision of specifically identified
safeguards now called the Miranda warnings (or equally effective measures
sufficient to dispel the otherwise inherently coercive environment such
interrogation creates).2 1 7  Frequently (albeit unhelpfully) described as a
"prophylactic rule," this additional requirement reflects an awareness that
courts cannot devise and feasibly apply a doctrinal test that will screen out all,
but only, those statements that are "compelled" in the constitutional sense (thus
perfectly protecting the "pure" scope of the right against self-incrimination). In
particular, applying a totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness on a
case-by-case basis would likely underenforce the scope of the right. Put
differently, this judicial doctrine would not satisfy the dictates of the Fifth
Amendment.218 On the other hand, the Miranda doctrine extends judicial
215. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
216. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (affirming this
interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause).
217. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-79; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428 (2000) (reaffirming the requirement of Miranda warnings).
218. Miranda is perhaps best understood as reflecting a judgment that the
voluntariness test, based on numerous state and federal trial judges' evaluations of the
totality of circumstances of a given interrogation, insufficiently protected the Fifth
Amendment right because of an unacceptably high error-rate. Despite courts' best efforts,
the voluntariness test likely will generate a number of false-negatives, meaning confessions
that are truly involuntary under the constitutional standard but that nevertheless survive a
court's case-by-case scrutiny, either because the factors are so subjective to balance, or
because it is difficult to reconstruct the facts of the interrogation (especially when the fact-
finding process often pits the claims of a suspect against those of police officers). See
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442 ("In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional
totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial
confession, a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in
the case in chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded that something more than the
totality test was necessary.") (citation omitted). The Court might have also been concerned
by the cost in terms of judicial resources in applying the voluntariness test on a case-by-case
basis, and the cost in terms of disuniformity of treatment (since lower courts seemed to be
making inconsistent decisions applying this subjective test). See id. at 444 ("[T]he
totality-of-the-circumstances test.., is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement
officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner."). Finally, the
requirement that officers themselves verbally articulate the specified warnings arguably
influences their own behavior in a way that reduces the frequency of actual coercion during
custodial interrogations. For at least the false-negative and maybe all of these reasons, the
Court decided that the totality-of-the-circumstances test was insufficient to protect the
constitutional right at stake, and thus decided instead to enforce the bright-line Miranda rules
so as to sufficiently minimize false-negatives and make the enforcement process judicially
more manageable and uniform.
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protection for the right against self-incrimination beyond that actually required
by the Court's own interpretation of the right's conceptual scope, in the sense
that the doctrinal test will occasionally lead to the suppression of statements
that were not actually compelled. The same general description fairly applies
to a large number of judicial doctrines, applied in the area of constitutional
criminal procedure and elsewhere.21 9
My cautionary note about the institutionalist critique of Boerne's
supremacy-based rigidity in assessing Section 5 measures is this: If the critique
justifiably supports judicial deference to congressional measures enforcing the
"true" scope of a constitutional right where the Court concedes that that scope
is broader than its own, underprotective judicial doctrine, one might plausibly
argue that the critique also supports judicial deference to congressional
measures providing lesser protection for a constitutional right, where the Court
concedes that the right's "true" scope is narrower than its own, overprotective
As an aside, despite many complaints to the contrary, this explanation of Miranda can
square it with many of the later-recognized "exceptions" to the Miranda rule, such as Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which held that statements obtained through non-
Miranda-compliant custodial interrogations can be used to impeach the defendant's
testimony at trial. The benefits and costs of applying Miranda's irrebuttable presumption
that non-Miranda-compliant interrogations are "compelled" differ when incriminating
statements are used for impeachment purposes rather than in the case-in-chief. The issue of
impeachability will arise only in a smaller subset of all cases, because many defendants will
not take the stand, and many of those who do will not perjure themselves in a manner
impeachable by their earlier confession, so the benefits of expanding the doctrinal test
beyond voluntariness are not as great in this context. Since fewer confessions will be at
issue, the absolute number of improperly admitted coerced confessions will be lower than if
the Court used the voluntariness test even for admissibility of statements in the case-in-chief.
Since fewer confessions will be at issue, the voluntariness test will consume fewer scarce
judicial resources and will lead to less divergent lower court decisions. And the requirement
that officers provide warnings to enable introduction of elicited statements in the
prosecutor's case-in-chief remains sufficient to influence police behavior so as to deter
actual coercion. On the other hand, the costs of an overinclusive doctrinal test would be
higher in the impeachment context-the use of non-Miranda-compliant confessions for
impeachment purposes is important to ensure that defendants do not have an opportunity to
take the stand and perjure themselves with impunity. I personally wonder whether the Court
reached the correct conclusion in Harris even given the somewhat different cost-benefit
analysis. But my point for present purposes is merely that it is not conceptually incoherent
for the Court to conclude in Miranda that the institutional inability of state and federal courts
to avoid false-negatives with the voluntariness test justifies a broader doctrine with respect to
the prosecution's case-in-chief, and yet to conclude in Harris that the same institutional
constraints do not justify a similarly broad doctrinal rule with respect to impeachment. One
can articulate a similar defense (with somewhat different cost-benefit criteria) of other
exceptions to Miranda, such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ("public safety"
exception), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) ("fruit of the poisonous tree"
exception).
219. For a list and discussion of judicial doctrines that overprotect the conceptual right
at issue, see Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MIcH. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2001) and David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 190 (1988).
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judicial doctrine. In other words, while in some cases Congress might offer
greater protection for a right than does the Court, in other cases such as
Miranda, Congress might respond to the judiciary's overenforcement of a right
by offering it somewhat lesser protection.
To be sure, one might counter that Section 5 should be interpreted as
containing a one-way ratchet, such that Congress can act to "correct" judicial
underprotection but not overprotection of Section 1 rights. Such a restriction
would conform to the notion that the separation of powers among our three
branches of government generally and intentionally generates a rights-
protective, libertarian bias.220 But Section 5's term "enforce" does not clearly
imply authority only for pro-rights congressional action, as opposed to any
congressional action that implements a valid congressional definition of the
Section 1 right however it compares to the Court's own view. Indeed, a couple
of scholars have maintained, at least in specific contexts, that such a strict one-
way ratchet cannot easily be squared with the institutional critique's premise.221
To my mind, the question of whether and in what contexts Congress may
supplant judicial doctrines with weaker protections for constitutional rights
turns on some complex jurisprudential considerations.22
220. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1504
(1987) ("[Bluilt into the general structure of the Constitution is a libertarian bias based on
checks against constitutionally suspect laws and in favor of the broadest of the various
constructions of the constitutional right given by the three branches."); Frank B. Cross,
Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1535 (2000)
(proposing, with respect to the allocation of interpretive authority among the three branches,
"a libertarian presumption that favors whichever institution is most protective of the liberty
in question").
221. See, e.g., Doff & Friedman, supra note 26 (suggesting Congress can retrench to
some extent from Miranda's safeguards, so long as the replacement set of safeguards is
"constitutionally adequate").
222. The Court has long explained that Section 5 "grants no power to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute these [Fourteenth Amendment] guarantees," Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), suggesting that Congress may not retrench to the point of
underprotecting a right. At most, Congress may retrench from judicial overprotection to a
lower level of protection that still minimally suffices to cover the right at its core. But the
notion of the right's "core," or the baseline against which the congressional measure
properly should be assessed, requires further exploration than I can provide here.
To identify the issue briefly, consider again the Miranda exemplar. Suppose Congress
were able to devise some means of regulating custodial interrogations, say a videotaping
requirement, that allowed courts applying that measure to screen out every single actually
coerced confession (i.e., producing no false-negatives) without simultaneously screening out
nearly so many voluntary confessions as do the Miranda warnings (i.e., minimizing the
false-positives). Such a congressional measure would retrench from the Miranda Court's
doctrinal protection for the right at stake in one sense, as it would reduce the number of
excluded confessions overall. But the measure would clearly remain constitutionally
adequate, as it would secure the same level of protection against the introduction of
unconstitutionally-elicited confessions.
But suppose Congress' proposed videotaping requirement would produce a small
number of false-negatives because it, like the pre-Miranda voluntariness test, would not
screen out each and every coerced statement. For ease of exposition, suppose a court
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While the Miranda exemplar identifies a plausible rights-regressive effect
of recognizing a static gap between abstract rights and judicial doctrine, the
dynamic perspecive of this right-doctrine gap developed by Professors Post
and Siegel raises a concern about rights-regression as well. Over the long haul,
a Congress with views divergent from the Court's might well persuade or
pressure the Court to relax rather than extend constitutional protections for
various individual rights. While the Court has typically felt far greater pressure
in this direction from states,223 Congress certainly has at times expressed
displeasure with what it views as overly expansive judicial protection of rights,
for example, considering efforts to strip the Court's jurisdiction over
constitutional issues such as abortion, busing, and school prayer. Such
congressional pressure might well subtly influence the Court's own views and
applying the pre-Miranda voluntariness test could assure itself of excluding only 75% of all
actually coerced confessions, with the other 25% slipping through the test as false-negatives.
By contrast, suppose a court applying the Miranda warnings would be confident of
excluding 99% of coerced confessions (at the cost of a high false-positive rate), and a court
applying Congress' videotaping requirement would be confident of excluding 95% of all
coerced confessions (with a much lower false-positive rate). Under these conditions, the
videotape requirement would clearly retrench from the Court's doctrinal protection for the
right at stake in a different sense than before; not only would it reduce the number of
excluded voluntary confessions, but it would also fail to exclude a greater percentage of
coerced confessions.
Even so, one might still view the videotape requirement as constitutionally adequate, if
one concludes that a 95% confidence level for exclusion satisfies the dictates of the Fifth
Amendment. Perhaps, in circumstances of inherently imperfect knowledge, constitutional
violations are plausibly understood in probabilistic terms, and correlatively, doctrines
implementing constitutional rights are plausibly understood as securing probabilistic states
of affairs. For example, procedural due process norms might be understood as dictating that
government cannot deprive someone of a property interest absent procedures guaranteeing a
sufficient probability that the deprivation is substantively lawful. Here, the argument would
run, the Fifth Amendment dictates that a prosecutor cannot introduce a defendant's statement
into her case in chief absent procedural safeguards guaranteeing a sufficient probability that
the statement was not compelled. Following this reasoning, and particularly given the
government's competing interest in minimizing the exclusion of voluntary confessions,
arguably a 95% confidence level is good enough to satisfy the Fifth Amendment norm. If
so, then the congressional videotape requirement would remain constitutionally sufficient
notwithstanding the fact that, as compared to the Miranda warnings, it would somewhat
reduce the protection against the introduction of compelled testimony in the prosecution's
case-in-chief.
Whether and in what contexts this probabilistic approach to defining constitutional
norms is legitimate and persuasive are questions worthy of further investigation. And
Dickerson's recent reaffirmation of Miranda provides little guidance on this point. On the
one hand, Dickerson baldly states that "Congress may not legislatively supersede our
decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution." 530 U.S. at 437. On the other hand,
Dickerson repeats Miranda's invitation to Congress to devise legislative alternatives that are
"at least as effective"--without clearly qualifying whether that would mean effective at the
99% or 95% confidence level in the preceding hypothetical. See Evan H. Caminker,
Miranda and Some Puzzles of Prophylactic Rules, 70 U. CiN. L. Rnv. (forthcoming 2001)
(tentatively exploring this probabilistic approach).
223. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (describing and denouncing a
pattern of state officials' obstruction of judicial efforts to desegregate schools).
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encourage or support its own proclivity towards judicial retrenchment in these
areas. One might wonder whether a self-conscious understanding by the Court
that it ought, at times, to follow Congress' lead in interpreting and
implementing constitutional norms might lead to judicial movement in both
directions, on different issues and at different historical moments.
At the very least, before embracing the implications of the institutionalist
critique for Boerne's constraints on Section 5, one must consider the potential
tradeoff here, and assess whether the potentially rights-enhancing effects of a
self-conscious judicial-legislative partnership in the concretization of
constitutional norms outweigh the potentially rights-regressive effects. My
tentative view is that, even if rights-regression is a legitimate concern here, the
likelihood that judicial doctrine more typically underprotects than overprotects
constitutional rights as abstractly defined makes the tradeoff a favorable one. It
may well be, however, that the Court's reluctance to embrace the critique's
premise in Boerne and its progeny, particularly in Kimel where the argument
was advanced by the United States but pointedly ignored by the Court z24
reflects some uncertainty as to whether in the long run the argument would
expand or contract the operationalized definition of constitutional rights.
Perhaps given this lack of certitude, the Court felt more comfortable retaining
strict control of the process of rights-declaration and implementation.
In any event, the Court's conclusion that retention of such strict control
justifies application of a rigorous congruence and proportionality assessment of
the means-ends relationship is properly criticized for an entirely different
reason: the Court cannot persuasively explain why this argument applies
uniquely to Section 5 measures and not to all necessary and proper Article I
measures as well.
b. The non-uniqueness critique.
Section 5 grants Congress power to "enforce" rather than to expand
Section l's provisions through substantive redefinition. But the Necessary and
Proper Clause similarly grants Congress power to "carry[] into execution"=
rather than to expand Article I's primary powers through substantive
redefinition. Thus any judicial concern for retaining control over the actual
implementation of constitutional norms is equally applicable to Congress'
Article I powers, where means-ends scrutiny serves to police precisely the same
conceptual boundary between Congress' adherence to the Court's constitutional
views and its "alteration of the Constitution's meaning." Article I authorizes
Congress to exercise power in specific categories of legislative activity, and the
224. See Brief for the United States at 22-31, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (Nos. 98-796 & 98-791) (arguing that the Court's application of rational
basis review to age discrimination reflects institutional constraints that can properly be
ignored by Congress in applying a more rigorous test for state employment decisions).
225. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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Court has long claimed responsibility for providing the authoritative
construction of this aspect of the Constitution's meaning. If Congress acts
beyond those powers conferred by Article I as defined by the Court, then by
Boerne's reasoning Congress has altered the meaning of the Constitution by
acting on a different definition than the Court's.
Suppose, for example, that Congress charters a National Bank. Following
the Court's approach in Boerne, one would have to conclude that, "[l]acking
such a connection"--meaning congruence and proportionality-this
"legislation may become substantive in operation and effect"226 in the sense that
it represents a congressional redefinition of the Constitution by extending
Article I powers beyond the limits defined by the Court. This was, of course,
precisely the argument originally lodged against Chief Justice Marshall's
reasoning in McCulloch.227 Thus, if the point of means-ends scrutiny is to
screen out legislative acts that, from the Court's perspective, "alter" rather than
conform to the Constitution's meaning, then one would expect the Court to
employ the same level of scrutiny to "necessary and proper" Article I
legislative measures as to "appropriate" Section 5 legislative measures. But, of
course, the Court has never suggested that a relaxed Article I means-ends test
would impermissibly enable Congress to change the meaning of the
Constitution.
Might Boerne be explained by a rights/powers distinction, presuming that
greater judicial vigilance is appropriate to preclude congressional redefinition
of rights than of powers? It is difficult to see why. The point of constraining
an "alteration" of Fourteenth Amendment rights in this context is simply to
cabin Congress' Section 5 powers, so at bottom the judicial concern focuses on
the scope of powers in any event. And in support of its court-centric view of
substantive constitutional meaning, Boerne invoked Chief Justice Marshall's
famous Marbury dictum that it is "the province of the Judicial Branch... to
say what the law is, '228 which of course was employed in Marbury to constrain
congressional power (there, to preclude Congress from unlawfully expanding
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction) rather than to protect individual
rights. Thus it is unclear why the Court's professed concern for policing the
substantive boundaries of the Constitution explains the heightened means-ends
scrutiny of "appropriate" measures uniquely in the Section 5 context.
226. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
227. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL's DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND (1969) (collecting essays critical of Marshall's analysis); R. Kent Newmyer, John
Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States' Rights Tradition, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. Rav. 875 (2000) (examining state opposition to McCulloch); Van Alstyne,
supra note 33, at 116 n.52 ("Characteristic of antifederalist objections to the sweeping clause
were fears that (in connection with the taxing power and/or the preamble to the proposed
Constitution) it would readily support acts of Congress completely displacing the authority
of state legislatures.").
228. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (quoting Marbury v,. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
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2. Concern for the appearance of legislative disregard for judicial
supremacy.
The preceding discussion assumed that Boerne's heightened means-ends
scrutiny reflects the Court's desire to maintain ultimate control over the actual
implementation of norms in the name of the Constitution. Perhaps instead the
Court is more concerned with appearances than with consequences. In
repeatedly admonishing that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution
should be regarded by Congress and all others as constitutionally supreme, the
Court might be advancing an expressivist rather than consequentialist claim:
the Court insists that Congress acknowledge, rather than challenge, the Court's
supremacy in this regard. In other words, perhaps what troubled the Court in
Boerne about Congress' purported "alteration" of the Constitution's substantive
meaning was not the effect this would have on the Constitution's actual
implementation, but rather the fact that it evidenced Congress' disrespect for
the Court's self-proclaimed role as ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning.
The core idea here is that "[s]tate action not only brings about material
consequences, it too expresses values and attitudes. Actions of the state have
social meanings as well as material consequences. 2 29 As Professor Richard
Pildes has explained, "[a]n expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or
attitudes expressed through a governmental action rather than from the more
tangible or material consequences the action brings about. '230
The claim that expressive harms play an underappreciated role in
constitutional interpretation has most fully been developed with respect to the
Supreme Court's equal protection and establishment clause jurisprudence.
Numerous scholars have observed that in these doctrinal realms, the Court has
invalidated governmental actions in large or whole part because those actions
entail social meanings that contravene constitutional values by visiting
expressive harms on individuals. In particular, these doctrines reflect a
sensitivity to the ways in which laws can send a message of exclusion and
denigration-laws that segregate people along racial lines or distinctly burden
racial minorities send a message that minorities are unworthy of equal concern
and respect; and laws that endorse particular religious viewpoints similarly
send a message that adherents to other religions or non-religion are
"outsiders. '231  More recently, several scholars have proposed that such
229. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 726 (1998).
230. Id. at 755.
231. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories
of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1533-51 (2000) (voting rights and
establishment clause jurisprudence); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It":
The Supreme Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986) (establishment clause
jurisprudence); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
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expressivist reasoning plays an important role in various strands of the Court's
recent federalism jurisprudence. 232  My suggestion here is that perhaps an
expressive concern underlies the Court's resistance to Section 5 measures that
appear to be non-remedial; such measures reveal a congressional attitude at
odds with the Court's interpretive superiority.
Some of Boerne's language arguably evinces a concern along these lines.
The Court cautioned that
[o]ur national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when
each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper
actions and determinations of the other branches. When the Court has
interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial
Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.233
Moreover, the Court suggested some concern with the way Congress' measures
might likely be viewed: "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a
substantive change in constitutional protections." 234 If the Court is worried
about whether Section 5 measures might be viewed as challenging and even
overriding its interpretive statements, the Court's insistence that Congress must
"identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions"-as defined by the Court--"and must tailor its legislative scheme
to remedying or preventing such conduct"2S becomes quite explicable.236
But if this is the Court's concern, it would not appear to justify fully the
Reno, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 483 (1993) (voting rights jurisprudence). But see Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1428-47
(2000) (evaluating critically expressivist claims in equal protection and establishment clause
jurisprudence).
232. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 231 (developing expressivist
explanations for various federalism doctrines); Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for
State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 81 (2001) (exploring but finding
unpersuasive an expressivist justification for state sovereign immunity doctrine); Adam B.
Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule?, 33
Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1309 (2000) (developing expressivist explanation for the anti-
commandeering rule). But see Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of
Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 71, 140-42 (summarily
rejecting suggestion that expressivism justifies anti-commandeering doctrine).
233. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36 (emphasis added); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) ("It is thus a 'permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system' that 'the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution."').
234. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added).
235. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 639 (1999).
236. More broadly, this worry might explain the Court's apparent reluctance to
acknowledge that there is a divergence between the Constitution-as-applied-by-courts and
the Constitution-in-the-abstract. See notes 198-202 supra and accompanying text. Such an
express acknowledgment might be perceived as undermining the Court's unique status as
constitutional arbiter as well.
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Court's imposition of such a strict means-ends tailoring requirement on Section
5 legislation. In light of this expressive concern, the Court's doctrinal question
ought merely to be whether Congress can defend a Section 5 measure as an
appropriate means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions without invoking, as a necessary step in the reasoning process, an
interpretation of those provisions that questions or disagrees with the Court's
previous interpretation (or, if the issue is novel, the Court's likely future
interpretation).
The Court correctly determined in Boerne that Congress could not, and
indeed did not really purport to, justify RFRA without directly challenging the
Court's previous interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. The
Government tried to defend RFRA as designed to protect individuals from state
laws that violate the Court's own understanding of the Clause because, while
neutral on their face, they nevertheless were "enacted with the unconstitutional
object of targeting religious beliefs and practices." 237  Unfortunately, the
evidence suggesting that state laws posed any such problem was meager at
best.238 Moreover, in a supposed effort to weed out the few (if any) such laws
that might truly threaten Court-defined free exercise norms, RFRA's reach and
scope would have invalidated a far greater number of state laws and executive
actions than could possibly be viewed as unconstitutional under the Court's
own standard: "In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not
ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry. 239 In sum, given the
Court's free exercise norm requiring an intent to harm religious exercise rather
than merely a detrimental impact on it, "Congress made no findings that might
have rendered RFRA reasonable in light of that norm, and findings of that sort
would have been virtually incredible." 240
But in any event, Congress itself did not even try to hide its antipathy
toward Smith and justify RFRA as consistent with Court-defined free exercise
norms. Instead, Congress candidly proclaimed its fundamental disagreement
237. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529; see id. ("'A law targeting religious beliefs as such is
never permissible."') (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993)).
238. Id. at 530 ("The history of persecution in this country detailed in the
[congressional] hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years."); see also
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81-82 ("[T]he legislative record contained
very little evidence of the unconstitutional conduct purportedly targeted by RFRA's
substantive provisions. Rather, Congress had uncovered only 'anecdotal evidence' that,
standing alone, did not reveal a 'widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this
country."' (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531)).
239. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535; see id. at 532-35.
240. Lupu, supra note 151, at 814; see id. at 817:
RFRA quite evidently manifested discontent with those decisions, rather than any desire to
remedy or prevent substantive violations of the Constitution as the Court understood it.
Congress thus designed RFRA to accomplish an object, which, in the Court's view, the
Constitution did not entrust to the federal government in its regulation of the states. The
claim that RFRA rested on Section 5 was a transparent pretext ....
1182 [Vol. 53:1127
HeinOnline  -- 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1182 2000-2001
"APPROPRIATE" CONSTRAINTS
with, and desire to displace, the Court's constitutional interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause. As the Court noted, RFRA's findings and purposes expressly
took issue with Smith and purported to restore the prior judicial "compelling
state interest" test that Smith itself had overruled, 241 and RFRA's passage
followed floor debates in which numerous members of Congress directly
criticized Smith's reasoning and result.242 In this respect, RFRA can be viewed
as a direct affront to the Court's claimed supremacy in constitutional
interpretation. 243 If the Court's separation of powers concern is triggered by a
perceived congressional disrespect for Supreme Court rulings, then Boerne is a
proper application of expressivist reasoning.
This concern, however, cannot readily justify the heightened means-ends
scrutiny applied in Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett. In Florida
Prepaid, Congress clearly had a legitimate end in mind: to protect property
interests in the form of copyrights from being taken by states without due
process. At most, Congress tried to protect such interests in an unduly broad
fashion; there was no suggestion that Congress acted in a manner that did or
would likely be perceived to disrespect governing Supreme Court precedent.
One can say the same about Kimel and Garrett; the ADEA and ADA did not
directly challenge the Court's prior interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, but were merely unextraordinary antidiscrimination statutes designed to
protect older and disabled employees from unfair treatment. In Morrison, the
Court assumed that Congress was striving to achieve the legitimate end of
securing the equal protection of state laws to victims of gender-motivated
violence rather than challenging the Court's interpretation of equal protection,
although the Court held that Congress' means were insufficiently tailored to
survive the congruence and proportionality test.244
Indeed, if cases such as these (as distinct from Boerne) trigger heightened
means-ends scrutiny based on a desire to forestall any appearance of legislative
repudiation of judicial interpretive supremacy, then the same scrutiny would
seem appropriate for Congress' exercises of Article I and Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment powers as well. In both cases, if Congress asserts its
power to the outer margin of that allowed by the capacious McCulloch test,
Congress might similarly be accused of evincing disrespect for the Court's
narrower construction of those powers, and thus indirectly challenging the
Court's interpretive supremacy. Once again, a superficially plausible
justification for heightened means-ends scrutiny proves not to explain the
uniquely rigorous scrutiny afforded Section 5 legislation.
241. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515.
242. Id. at 515-16.
243. See Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 454 ("In Boerne, the Court was plainly
provoked by Congress' openly expressed purpose to nullify the Court's own interpretation of
the First Amendment in Smith.").
244. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000).
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3. Constitutional turf.- the "province" of the judiciary.
The preceding subsections explored whether the Court's separation of
powers rhetoric might reflect a specific concern for either the consequential or
expressive significance of Congress' divergence from judicially defined norms.
But perhaps the Court's approach reflects an even simpler, more primordial
attitude about turf battles over constitutional authority. The Court might be
thinking something like the following:
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards certain constitutional
rights, and the definition of rights is peculiarly the "province of the Judicial
Branch."245 When Congress enforces this Amendment, Congress is essentially
facilitating or assisting the exercise of a core judicial power. Therefore,
congressional measures are "appropriate" only if they fully support and assist,
rather than purport to modify, our exercise of that judicial power.
This understanding would be correct in part: when Congress enacts
measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers vested in
departments other than itself, those measures must assist, rather than alter or
hinder, the other department's exercise of its own powers.246 One might
therefore object to specific congressional measures that seem adversarial
toward rather than respectful and supportive of the other department's vested
functions.
But it is wrong to equate the establishment of new individual rights with a
vesting of power in the judicial branch per se. Contrary to the Court's assumed
premise here, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not vest power in
any department of the federal government, let alone the federal judiciary in
particular. Rather, Section 1 grants certain persons citizenship status and
places various boundaries on the powers of state government. And while the
Court's Article III power to decide cases and controversies encompasses the
subsidiary power to enforce Section l's citizenship-conferral and state
boundaries in a proper case, Section 5 expressly grants Congress the power to
enforce them as well. It is a category error, therefore, to assume that the
protection of Section 1 rights is vested in or otherwise "belongs" to the
judiciary in a manner that suggests Congress is somehow legislating on foreign
turf when it enacts Section 5 measures.
245. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. For perhaps an even more emphatic statement, see
Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963 (2001) (referring to the "long-
settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the
substance of constitutional guarantees").
246. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the
Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. Rnv. 75, 103:
In other words, in connection with the powers of the other branches, the Necessary and
Proper Clause operates like a one-way ratchet: it lets Congress make laws facilitating the
powers (hence discretion) of the other branches, but it gives Congress no power, no
discretion, over whether, how far, or how those other branches should perform the roles
contemplated for them by the Constitution. The words "for carrying into Execution" are
wholly unsuited to authorize laws which diminish, curtail, or interfere.
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The Framing history of the Fourteenth Amendment starkly highlights this
category error. As explained earlier,247 Congress' considered choice of
terminology, voluminous legislative debates, and broad construction of the
identically worded Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause in the 1866
Civil Rights Act all reveal a clear intention that Congress should enjoy a broad
range of power to enforce Section 1 rights based on McCulloch's liberal means-
ends standard. And in particular, Congress' evident concern that the Supreme
Court was predisposed against a broad construction of Section 1 rights24 belies
any suggestion that Congress intended to vest the judiciary with exclusive or
even primary jurisdiction with respect to safeguarding those rights.
Perhaps the Court's separation of powers rhetoric in Boerne and its
progeny reveals a primordial predisposition that enforcement of Section 1
rights lies peculiarly within the judicial province, and therefore Congress must
be relegated to a junior helpmate. But if so, the Court's unreflective attitude
begs the central question here. The plain language and historical evidence
supporting the incorporation of McCulloch-style means-ends reasoning into
Congress' Section 5 power is simply too strong to be first ignored, so as to
allow the Court to construct a judicial-centric vision of Section 1-and then
assumed away during the construction of Section 5, because it is inconsistent
with that vision of Section 1. The Fourteenth Amendment does not lie
exclusively on judicial rather than congressional turf.
In the end, the Supreme Court is frustratingly unclear about the precise
nature of its claim that a McCulloch-style means-ends test applied to Section 5
measures uniquely raises separation of powers concerns. If the Court's
objective is to maintain ultimate control over the actual implementation of
constitutional norms, then the Court's doctrinal approach is questionable on a
variety of fronts. And if instead the Court's objective is to maintain the
appearance of judicial interpretive supremacy by rebuffing congressional
efforts to repudiate judicial decisionmaking, this objective can at best explain
only Boerne, not its progeny.
There is one other plausible reading of the Boerne Court's separation of
powers focus. The Court observed that, if Congress could "define its own
powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning... it is difficult to
conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power.1249 Might the
Court's concern about congressional redefinition really merge into a federalism
concern about the scope of congressional power at the expense of the states? I
now turn to this question.
247. See notes 164-181 supra and accompanying text.
248. See note 181 supra and accompanying text.
249. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
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C. Federalism Justifications for Heightened Means-Ends Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has suggested that two different constitutional values
underlie its stricter means-ends tailoring requirement: maintaining the Court's
authority to provide the definitive interpretation of the Constitution, and
preserving the proper balance of power between the federal and state
governments. The federalism concern can itself be understood in two different
ways: the first focuses on the potential breadth of Congress' regulatory
authority in general, and the second focuses on Congress' authority to impose
regulatory burdens on state governments in particular. This division
corresponds to a distinction between two categories of federalism values.
"Jurisdictional values" concern the allocation of law-making authority between
the federal and state governments, and protect the states' proper sphere of
exclusive regulatory jurisdiction. "Sovereignty values" concern
intergovernmental relations, and protect the states from federal regulatory
burdens, thereby preserving the states' status and dignity as co-equal
sovereigns.
It is conceivable that the identical concepts of "necessary and proper" and
"appropriate" should be given different application in different legislative
contexts, to the extent that they generate different implications for either or
both of these categories of federalism values. I explore such an argument by
considering these categories in turn.
1. Jurisdictional values and the federal-state allocation of law-making
authority.
Over the past decade, this Court has increasingly expressed concern about
the general expansion of Congress' regulatory authority and the concomitant
shrinking of the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the states. The Court and
commentators have identified several structural values purportedly served by
dividing law-making jurisdiction between the federal and state governments, a
division secured by respecting the Constitution's delegation of limited powers
to the former.
Circumscription of congressional power is frequently defended as serving
one or more of the following values: (1) enhancing the responsiveness of
government to the specific needs and desires of members of a heterogenous
society, through (a) decentralizing decisionmaking so as to allow greater
tailoring to local interests, (b) creating smaller government units so as to bring
government officials closer to the people, and (c) generating competition for a
mobile citizenry; (2) enhancing national social welfare by permitting and
encouraging states to act as laboratories experimenting with diverse solutions to
economic and social problems, generating useful information for the nation as a
whole; (3) stimulating the development of democratic skills and attitudes by
providing more accessible fora for citizen participation in self-governance; and
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(4) sustaining a set of competing institutions with the incentive, as well as the
political and economic capital, to identify and oppose the assertion and
especially overreaching of Congress' regulatory authority and thus reduce the
risk of federal tyranny 5 0 I call these "jurisdictional values" because they
support a narrow view of the scope of federal legislative jurisdiction.
Boerne and its progeny strongly suggest that the congruence and
proportionality standard for prophylactic Section 5 legislation is motivated, at
least in part, by a desire to preserve these jurisdictional values by construing
Section 5 power narrowly. Boerne observes that if Congress can cross the line
between "remedial" and "substantive" legislation in the Section 5 context, then
"it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional
power."' A substantive reading of Section 5 authority might enable Congress
"to prescribe uniform national laws with respect to life, liberty, and
property. 'z2
The Supreme Court highlighted this federalism concern even more directly
in Morrison, claiming that limits on Congress' Section 5 power "are necessary
to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully
crafted balance of power between the States and the National Government." 2 3
This language tracks Morrison's similar concern about an expansive reading of
Congress' Commerce Clause authority, which could also "obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority. ' '2" 4
While the Court thus recognizes that both expansive Section 5 and Article I
powers might threaten to upset the proper federal-state balance, the Court
nowhere explains in Boerne and its progeny why policing the proper
boundaries of federal power requires a much stricter means-ends tailoring
requirement in the Section 5 context. Recall that in the Article I context, the
Court has repeatedly maintained that if "the means adopted are really
calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which
they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means
adopted, and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination
alone." 5s Is there good reason to believe the same relaxed means-ends test
would pose a uniquely greater threat of obliterating the Constitution's
distinction between national and local authority?
250. See Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1351, 1365 (2000); see also, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) (providing narrower but similar list of federalism values); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 524-33 (1995) (evaluating similar list of values);
Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997) (same).
251. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
252. Id. at 523.
253. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000).
254. Id. at 615; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (making
a similar assertion).
255. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934).
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The strongest argument supporting heightened scrutiny in the Section 5
context is that Section l's proscriptions on state action are potentially so broad
that a McCulloch-style means-ends test would uniquely allow Congress to
intrude significantly into heretofore exclusively state territory. "Ever since the
resurrection of substantive due process and the Supreme Court's expansion of
the constitutional ideal of equality," Professor Ira (Chip) Lupu has maintained,
"there has lurked the possibility" that, with a relaxed means-ends test,
Congress could become what the Court has refused to be-a "perpetual censor
upon all legislation of the States." The [Fourteenth] [A]mendment is
sufficiently broad in its language and historical meaning that it puts virtually
no subject off legislative limits for Congress .... [A] power so broad would
end the concept of a Congress limited in its coercive authority to textually
designated subjects of national significance-commerce, intellectual property,
bankruptcy, national defense, etc.256
Of course, Professor Lupu's concluding sentence is false by definition; no
matter how broad the resulting enforcement power might be, it would still
reflect a "textually designated subject[] of national significance." More
significantly, the sentiment behind it, that the resulting power would be both
uniquely and unacceptably broad in a system of limited federal authority, rests
on questionable footing.
First, as foreshadowed earlier, it is difficult to view this concern as unique.
Precisely the same criticism was originally levied at McCulloch's relaxed
means-ends tailoring requirement, 57 and yet the Court has continued for almost
two centuries to adhere to this canonical statement of the breadth of Congress'
implied Article I powers. To be sure, the Fourteenth Amendment's definitions
of citizenship, liberty, property and equality-and thus judicially defined
restrictions on state power--expanded considerably over the second half of the
nineteenth century. But this is equally true of the power to regulate interstate
commerce, perhaps the most significant of Congress' Article I powers.258 Many
other Article I powers have expanded as well; for example, the advent of
modem technology has transformed the Armed Forces provisions into a far
greater and more awesome power than was true two centuries ago. And the
Court has applied McCulloch's deferential standard to Congress' Section 2
256. Lupu, supra note 151, at 812 (footnote omitted); see also Ernest A. Young, State
Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 49 (asserting that
congressional authority "to avert merely hypothetical constitutional violations.., would
render Section 5 a far-reaching grant of power indeed").
257. See note 227 supra.
258. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 ("l]n the years since [1937], Congress has had
considerably greater latitude in regulating conduct and transactions under the Commerce
Clause than our previous case law permitted.") (citation omitted); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) ("The Federal Government undertakes activities today that
would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers
would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second,
because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the
States, would assume such responsibilities.").
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power to enforce the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, even though
(especially given the absence of a state action constraint) one might plausibly
argue that this power gives Congress "nearly plenary authority... to protect all
but the most trivial individual rights from both governmental and private
invasion." 9  While various political forces might successfully pressure
Congress not to exercise the full potential of its Article I and Section 2
authority,260 the same or similar forces have the opportunity and incentives to
pressure Congress to stay its Section 5 hand as well.261 Thus, there appears to
be no sharp contrast between Congress' Section 5 and its Article I or Section 2
powers with respect to their potential to "obliterate the Constitution's
distinction between national and local authority. '262 If the heightened means-
ends test is designed to compensate for a broadening over time of the scope of
Congress' legitimate ends, then it is unclear why it should apply uniquely to
Section 5 authority.263
Second, any concern that a liberal construction of a particular federal
power would allow Congress to intrude too deeply into traditional realms of
state authority should be evaluated by qualitative as well as quantitative
criteria. The Court frequently seems to be focused exclusively on an
acontextual worry about opening the door to a broad quantity of congressional
regulations. But whether a particular scope of federal authority is considered
undue necessarily turns on a nuanced, clause-specific inquiry. For example, the
Court has given broad range to Congress' war and related military powers
because of their essentially national character, notwithstanding the potential for
intrusion into areas of traditional state police powers.264  A compelling
259. 1 TRIBE, supra note 28, at 927.
260. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLtuM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
261. As a formal matter, one might argue that states will act alone in lobbying against
Section 5 measures because only states are directly regulated, whereas states will generally
have some private interests aligned with them to lobby against Article I legislation, given
that such legislation typically applies generally to states and private entities alike. But the
significance of this formal distinction is often overstated. First, federal regulations of state
conduct (such as RFRA) typically will negatively affect some private interests as well, such
that in theory states do not stand alone in opposition. Moreover, VAWA primarily regulated
private rather than state conduct, and the Patent Act and ADEA imposed burdens on state
and private actors alike. In any event, states themselves seem to hold their own when
engaged in focused lobbying on Capitol Hill.
262. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
263. Moreover, even if it might occasionally be legitimate for a court employing a
functionalist interpretive methodology to construe one power narrowly in order to
compensate for a broadening of power elsewhere, such compensatory balancing seems
unavailable for a Court purporting to employ an originalist or other formalist interpretive
methodology. See Evan H. Caminker, Context and Complementarity Within Federalism
Doctrine, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 167-68 (1998).
264. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) ("The case arises in the
context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no
1189May 2001]
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argument can be made that congressional efforts to enforce antidiscrimination
norms in particular, and other Fourteenth Amendment rights more generally,
similarly represent an appropriately "national" response to a matter of national
concern over which the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically and
intentionally divested states of exclusively local control.26 As the Court has
acknowledged, "[a]s a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the
post-Civil War era-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
its centerpiece-the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic
federal rights against state power was clearly established." 266 Indeed, given the
centrality of equality and due process norms to this country both after the Civil
War and during the past half-century, a broad Section 5 authority might be
qualitatively more appropriate than a broad Article I authority of the same
quantitative dimensions.
Third, even accepting the premise that a McCulloch-style Section 5 power
would be unprecedented in its breadth, it would still overlap significantly with
Congress' Article I powers. As a result, many exercises of Section 5 power
could be justified as exercises of Article I powers as well; this is true for the
statutes at issue in Florida Prepaid, College Savings, Kimel, and Garrett,
although not Boerne or Morrison. Where the powers overlap, a broadly
defined Section 5 power poses no unique concerns with respect to Congress'
ability to regulate in general or regulate state conduct in particular. Whereas in
Kimel Congress can employ Article I to govern state activity and enforce its
regulations through a variety of judicial avenues, 267 the only added significance
to an additional Section 5 foundation is Congress' ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from private damages actions. This may raise unique
issues concerning "sovereignty values" which I will consider in the next
section, but does not implicate the more general concern about Congress'
ability to intrude into local rather than national matters and the various values
of decentralized decisionmaking. At best, then, a concern for "jurisdictional"
federalism values supports heightened means-ends scrutiny only where
Congress seeks to exercise Section 5 power beyond the reach of its other
constitutional powers.
Finally, this rationale for heightened means-ends scrutiny of Section 5
measures cannot easily explain the Court's apparent application of the same
rigorous scrutiny to Section 2 measures designed to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment. The ends authorized by this Section 2 are far more constrained
than those authorized by Section 5; whereas the latter touch upon a wide
variety of liberty and property interests in a wide variety of contexts, the former
focus exclusively on voting rights. For this reason, Section 2 could not
other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.").
265. See Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 507-510 (developing such an argument to
question heightened scrutiny of antidiscrimination measures).
266. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,238-39 (1972).
267. See note 12 supra.
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possibly give rise to a legitimate fear that, if construed to require only
McCulloch-style means-ends tailoring, it would functionally award Congress a
virtually plenary police power. 2 1 And yet, Boerne strongly suggests that
Section 2 measures designed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment are subject to
stringent congruence and proportionality analysis as well.269 If so, there must
be some other argument doing the work.
2. Sovereignty values and congressional regulation of states in their
sovereign capacities.
Finally we come to an argument that the Supreme Court pointedly chose
not to advance anywhere in Boerne or its progeny: shrinking Congress'
Section 5 power through the rigorous congruence and proportionality test
protects states from being regulated in their sovereign capacities. While
Section 5 clearly authorizes Congress to regulate states qua states, the argument
would run, such regulation should be disfavored because it contravenes the
notion that states are independent and co-equal sovereign entities. Heightened
means-ends scrutiny is a creative (if atextual) way of implementing this
disfavored status, by interposing a meaningful barrier for each Section 5
measure to hurdle. Seen in this light, Boerne can be viewed as "a first cousin
of the state sovereignty principle of New York v. United States" and related
cases. 2 0
It is not surprising, however, that the Court failed to articulate this
justification for rigorous means-ends scrutiny, because the premise is at odds
with the oft-proclaimed axiom that the Fourteenth Amendment in general, and
268. See Doff & Friedman, supra note 26.
269. Boerne does not expressly equate the two standards, and I suppose one might
argue that the Court contrasted RFRA with various provisions of the Voting Rights Act
previously upheld as valid Fifteenth Amendment Section 2 enforcement measures merely to
highlight the distinctions between a well-tailored and poorly tailored enforcement measure,
without meaning to hold that such well-tailoring is now a prerequisite for the
constitutionality of Section 2 measures (i.e., without "rewriting" the Katzenbach and City of
Rome decisions). But I think the fairer reading of Boerne is that the Court did impliedly
modify the means-ends standard applicable to Section 2 measures as well as Section 5
measures. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (citing cases regarding
Congress' enforcement powers under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Eighteenth Amendments
without making any distinction among those powers for purposes of its analysis); see also
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 294 n.6 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Although City of Boerne involved the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, we
have always treated the nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments as coextensive."); Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th
Cir. 1999) (concluding that the standards for Section 5 and Section 2 enforcement measures
are the same); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights
and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 725, 725 n.5 (1998) ("[B]ecause the
two amendments are rough contemporaries and their enforcement power provisions are
articulated in similar terms, the analysis [in Boerne] surely carries over.").
270. Lupu, supra note 151, at 816 n.110 (citations omitted).
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Section 5 in particular, were designed specifically to override state sovereignty
claims in this regulatory realm. This tension is most clearly visible with respect
to Section 5 measures that Congress can enact pursuant to some other grant of
power as well (such as the Commerce Clause), but the tension remains even
with respect to measures for which Section 5 provides the only arguable source
of congressional power.
First, consider a statute such as Kimel's ADEA, which incontrovertibly
falls within Congress' Article I powers even with respect to its regulation of
state conduct.27' There is no question here that Congress can fetter state
discretion by declaring certain state conduct illegal. Moreover, Congress can
enforce such proscriptions in a variety of ways, including suits brought by the
United States for prospective or retrospective relief and suits brought by
aggrieved private parties for prospective relief. 272 Suppose further that the
ADEA would lie within Congress' Section 5 authority as well, if the Court
employed the conventional McCulloch means-ends standard for determining
"appropriate" enforcement measures. Such a determination would be relevant
for only one reason: it would enable Congress to enforce the ADEA's
proscriptions on state conduct through the additional means of abrogating the
state's sovereign immunity and authorizing private damages actions, a means
unavailable to Congress exercising only Article I powers. But as the Court
proclaimed in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer27 3 and repeated numerous times since,274
abrogation pursuant to Section 5 is permissible because the states agreed to this
congressional power through ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
worked a "corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the
States. '27- Thus, the only reason to reject a McCulloch-style Section 5 would
be to protect an aspect of state sovereignty that the state has specifically
waived.276 It is one thing to impose a hurdle such as a clear statement rule to
271. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,78 (2000).
272. See note 12 supra.
273. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
274. See, e.g., Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955,962 (2001).
275. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 455.
276. Bitzer speaks in terms of the scope of congressional power, rather than expressly
of state "waiver" of its erstwhile immunity. But the Court elsewhere uses the language of
waiver or consent explicitly to describe the states' agreement in this and other contexts to
being sued notwithstanding background immunity principles. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 755 (1999) ("The States have consented, moreover, to some suits pursuant to the
plan of the Convention or to subsequent constitutional amendments."); id. at 756 ("[I]n
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the States to surrender a portion of
the sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that
Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to its § 5
enforcement power."); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934)
(explaining that the vulnerability of a state to suit by the United States or a sister state is
based on "[t]he waiver or consent, on the part of a state, which inheres in the acceptance of
the constitutional plan").
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ensure that Congress really intends to override state sovereign immunity,277 but
it is quite another thing-indeed, it is incoherent-to narrow the scope of
Section 5 authority specifically to preclude Congress from doing the very thing
that the states themselves consented to allow Congress to do.278
Second, consider a statute such as Boerne's RFRA, which falls outside of
Congress' Article I powers as applied to state conduct. Here, more is at stake
than merely whether a McCulloch-style Section 5 would allow Congress to
enforce regulations of state activity through private damages actions; the
question is whether Congress may enforce regulations of state activity at all. A
Court protective of the states' broad sovereignty interest in being free from
direct congressional regulation might well conclude that the best way to protect
that interest is to eschew McCulloch and narrow the scope of Congress'
regulatory authority.
But the profound federalism principle motivating Bitzer and a long line of
related cases undermines the sovereignty-protection rationale for rigorous
means-ends scrutiny. The Court in Bitzer and its progeny did not (and could
not persuasively) argue that Section 5's terms "enforce" or "appropriate," when
compared to "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution," uniquely
authorize private damages suits against states. These cases necessarily rest on a
broader, atextual principle.
The Court has distinguished Bitzer from Seminole Tribe's holding that
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I on
historical grounds, focusing on the following chronology: the Eleventh
Amendment's purported restatement of immunity principles was ratified
subsequent to (and therefore qualifies) Article I authority, but the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified subsequent to (and therefore can be read as
qualifying) the Eleventh Amendment's immunity principles.279 But the mere
277. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-57 (1996).
278. This is not to say that every statute applicable to states under Article I is
necessarily a valid Section 5 enforcement measure as well, but merely that principles of state
sovereignty provide no reason to withhold Section 5 status from a valid Article I statute if
that statute would otherwise come within Section 5's proper McCulloch-mimicking scope.
One might argue that Section 5 authority to enact a statute that already lies within
Congress' Article I power is significant not only because it enables Congress to authorize
private damages suits against the state, but also because it enables Congress to
"commandeer" state officials to implement federal law. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Printz,
State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 199, 233-43 (suggesting
federalism objections to Section 5 commandeering are inapposite but querying whether
Printz's apparent Article II objections to commandeering might still apply). If this is so, it is
because through ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, states waived their erstwhile
immunity from commandeering as well as from private suits for damages. The same
analysis therefore applies: It makes no sense to narrow the scope of Section 5 authority just
to preclude the very commandeering of state officials to which the states themselves gave
their constructive consent.
279. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S,
41-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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fact that the Fourteenth Amendment followed the Eleventh does not necessarily
mean the former repealed the latter in whole or in part; nor does it provide any
basis, without more, for determining the extent of the implied repeal. 280 And
one cannot plausibly claim that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had
in mind any specific intent to override the states' immunity from private
damages claims arising under federal law, because the states' immunity was not
clearly held to reach this far (as opposed to protecting states from unconsented
suits based on state law) until after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.281
Moreover, Bitzer and its progeny cannot easily rest on a judgment that
private damages suits against states are intrinsically more necessary to enable
Congress to "enforce" Fourteenth Amendment restrictions than to enforce
Article I statutory schemes. Indeed, the Court has never hinted that the
congressional options still available under Article I, including suits by the
United States or sister states for damages and suits by private individuals for
prospective relief,2 2 somehow become constitutionally inadequate and hence in
need of supplementation in the Fourteenth Amendment context.
The question thus remains why Bitzer correctly construed the Fourteenth
Amendment to work an implied partial repeal of the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The reason is this: The Reconstruction Amendments
in general, and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular, worked a significant
shift in the federal-state balance of power, as part of which the states waived
various features of their erstwhile sovereign status. Put differently, the
Fourteenth Amendment reconstituted the constitutional conception of state
sovereignty, embracing one that eschewed various immunities from
congressional regulation that the states had previously enjoyed.2 3 Long before
280. For example, if one can read the Fourteenth Amendment as impliedly repealing
erstwhile Eleventh Amendment restrictions on exercises of Section 5 power, why not
similarly read the Fourteenth Amendment as impliedly repealing erstwhile Eighth
Amendment constraints on Section 5 power, such that Congress could authorize cruel and
unusual punishment as a means of deterring state violations of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses? No one takes seriously the latter implication. See DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, 573-74
(1990) (noting the absurdity of such a conclusion draws into question any reliance on
chronology alone to explain Bitzer).
281. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
bars federal claim brought against state by citizen of same state); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711 (1883) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal claim brought against
state by citizen of a different state); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 21 (making this point).
282. See note 12 supra. Specifically, Congress can authorize the United States to sue
states on behalf of aggrieved individuals for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment in its
capacity as parens patriae. See Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 111 (1997)
(arguing that the United States should seek federal judicial relief from violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment when the states or state officials act in a way that implicates
systemic public interests).
283. Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and our Bifircated
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Bitzer, the Court had in a line of cases
sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments,
into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States. The legislation considered in each case was grounded
on the expansion of Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of
state sovereignty-found to be intended by the Framers and made part of the
Constitution upon the States' ratification of those Amendments, a
phenomenon aptly described as a "carv[ing] out" in Exparte Virginia... 284
This diminution of state sovereignty reflected a broadening of congressional
power with respect to both of what I have called jurisdictional and sovereignty
values: Congress has broader authority to regulate matters of which states had
previously exercised exclusive legislative jurisdiction, 285 and Congress has
broader authority directly to regulate states qua states. Thus, even with respect
to enforcement measures for which Section 5 provides the exclusive foundation
for congressional authority, the only reason to reject a McCulloch-based
construction of relaxed means-ends scrutiny would be to protect an aspect of
sovereignty that the state has waived. Such protection simply flies in the face
of the Fourteenth Amendment's framing vision. 28 6
To be sure, given the current Court's view of the central role played by
state sovereignty in our constitutional scheme, it is quite understandable that
the Court might want to "'indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver' 28 7 of that immunity in specific contexts. This presumption can explain
Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1259 (2001).
284. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 455-56; see also Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)
("The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a
degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and
to enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.").
285. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) ("[W]hen properly
exercising its power under § 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment
constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers."); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) ("As against the reserved powers of the States,
Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting.").
286. See Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 975 (2001) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("Rules for interpreting § 5 that would provide States with special protection,
however, run counter to the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Gardbaum, supra
note 27, at 683-84:
If anything, one would expect the federalism constraints on the Necessary and Proper Clause
to be greater than those on Section 5, since the former is part of the original Constitution and
the latter is part of the Fourteenth Amendment that was aimed specifically at the states and
designed to limit their jurisdiction. Interpreting Section 5 as imposing more rigorous
federalism constraints on Congress than does the Necessary and Proper Clause would appear
historically and conceptually anomalous ....
See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 106 (2000) (asking rhetorically why the modem Court
treats Reconstuctors such as John Bingham and Charles Sumner with less reverence and
respect than original Founders such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson).
287. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
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the Court's clear statement rule insisting that congressional attempts to regulate
states in general, and to abrogate their immunity from private suit in particular,
be expressed in unmistakably clear language.28 But it is one thing to give teeth
to the political safeguards of federalism by making sure Congress intends to
assert its authority within the realm of the states' waiver of their sovereignty,
and quite another thing to truncate that authority by ruling out enforcement
measures that fall comfortably within the conventional McCulloch-style means-
ends nexus, Congress' clarity of intent notwithstanding. The latter move
cannot be said to police the waiver acknowledged in Bitzer and elsewhere;
rather, it repeals that waiver in significant part-of course without admitting
such.289
In the end, it is difficult to develop a satisfactory justification for the
Court's unique application of heightened means-ends scrutiny in the Section 5
context that can explain Boerne and all of its progeny.20 Given the strong
originalist arguments favoring, and the century-plus of judicial decisions
embracing, the McCulloch standard in the Section 5 context, the congruence
and proportionality test seems an inexplicable anomaly in means-focused
jurisprudence.
D. Implications of Returning to a McCulloch-Style Section 5
Were the Court to return to its pre-Boerne jurisprudence and employ
McCulloch's more relaxed means-ends requirement, Congress would still not
666, 682 (1999).
288. Id. at 678.
289. Moreover, even a desire to roll back Bitzer's waiver of state sovereignty cannot
readily explain the Court's decision in Morrison. The VAWA provision invalidated there
imposed duties primarily on private rather than state actors, and therefore was consonant
with, rather than dissonant with, the principle of state sovereignty.
290. Consider one final argument: Professors Marci Hamilton and David Schoenbrod
argue that proportionality analysis for Section 5 measures is dictated by the law of remedies,
which generally holds that remedies (such as injunctions and damages assessments) should
always be proportional to the constitutional right being violated. See Marci A. Hamilton &
David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analyis Under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 469 (1999). Leaving aside the fact that
Section 5 authorizes Congress to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions rather
than to remedy violations thereof, the requirement of right-remedy proportionality embedded
within the law of remedies reflects a traditional constraint on the exercise of equitable
authority by the judiciary, not the exercise of remedial authority by a legislature. Moreover,
the authors' claim that recent affirmative action decisions apply such a proportionality
analysis to Section 5 legislation, id. at 475-79, is unpersuasive; the heightened means-ends
scrutiny in these cases reflects a concern for race-based decisionmaking, not a more general
concern for the scope of Section 5 authority.
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be given carte blanche authority to regulate the states whenever and however it
desired. Obviously, the Court could still rightly insist that a congressional
measure be reasonably adapted to prevent or remedy state action threatening
judicially defined rights, and Congress would still need some rational
explanation as to why it believes that judicially crafted remedies for those
violations of rights are somehow inadequate by themselves. Despite the
seeming expansiveness of McCulloch's formulation, such an explanation would
not always be available.
Suppose, for example, the Court held that a person sentenced to death for
committing a state crime has a procedural due process right to a judicial
hearing regarding the legality of his sentence whenever she can make a "truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence."' 29' Suppose further that
Congress wanted to lower the required threshold showing to a "plausible
demonstration" of actual innocence. Leaving aside any argument (which I
tentatively find unpersuasive) that the Court's threshold underprotects the
"abstract" due process right due to state comity or other institutional concerns, I
am unsure how Congress could claim that its lowering of the threshold
"enforces" the judicially defined due process right. Rather, the judicial test is
perfectly congruent with the judicially defined right, and therefore any
congressional deviation therefrom would seem to redefine rather than enforce
the scope of that right.
To be sure, if the Court held that the Constitution secures a substantive
right not to be executed if actually innocent of the crime, 292 then Congress
might be able to enact a broader propbylactic rule such as an outright
prohibition of the death penalty, on the ground that even careful judicial review
after the proper threshold demonstration had been made would not be perfectly
successful in screening out all cases in which an innocent person has been
sentenced to death. Different judicial interpretations of rights will necessarily
enable different congressional enforcement measures. My point here is simply
that even the McCulloch test embraces some limits and should not be confused
with a plenary congressional power. But the McCulloch test would, I believe,
be sufficiently capacious to embrace the statutes invalidated in Florida
Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett.
IV. SPECULATION ABOUT BOERNE'S GENERATIVE SIGNIFICANCE FOR
CONGRESS' OTHER EXECUTORY POWERS
In Boerne and its progeny, the Supreme Court applied its new means-ends
tailoring requirement expressly to prophylactic legislation enacted pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and implicitly to Section 2 of the
291. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (assuming this for sake of
argument).
292. Id. at 431-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Fifteenth Amendment.293 But because the rationale for this heightened scrutiny
remains obscure, it is unclear what, if any, generative significance Boerne's
approach might have for other sources of congressional power, in particular
Article I and the other Enforcement Clauses such as Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Certain of the rationales explored here, such as a desire to protect
state sovereignty values by narrowing Congress' authority to regulate states qua
states, seemingly have little direct implication for Congress' exercise of Article
I or other Enforcement Clause authority to regulate private behavior. But other
rationales, such as a desire to protect the jurisdictional values of federalism by
narrowing congressional power generally, or to protect the judiciary's actual or
apparent interpretive supremacy concerning the scope of constitutional rights,
apply equally to support heightened constraints on congressional power across
the board. The Court has yet to face in recent years any case concerning the
scope of Congress' executory powers under either Article I or the other
Enforcement Clauses. But the Court has whittled away at the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause authority, probably Congress' most oft-used and
significant primary power, reflecting that a generous doctrinal construction
would make it difficult to identify "any activity by an individual that Congress
is without power to regulate. '294 One can imagine the current Court voicing a
similar concern about the scope of executory laws under the conventional
McCulloch standard. Given the Boerne Court's evident willingness to cast
- aside thirteen decades of case law applying McCulloch to Section 5 legislation,
one wonders whether the Court might be inclined, perhaps silently rather than
expressly, to let its new-found concern for means-ends rigor bleed over into
any future constructions of the scope of executory Article I and other powers as
well. While I think this doctrinal shift unlikely, current signs remain somewhat
ominous.
Perhaps the real issue driving this trend, and thus partly determining its
ultimate breadth and longevity, is the Court's evident concern that Congress
increasingly has failed to take seriously its own institutional responsibilities in
defining and respecting the boundaries of its constitutional authority. Reading
Boerne, one can readily imagine the majority thinking as follows:
Back in the 1960s, Congress generally took seriously the notion that it needed
to do some careful thinking and preparatory homework before imposing broad
burdens on state authority. In the Voting Rights Act, for example, Congress
carefully developed a record of widespread state misconduct and explained
why a broad set of prophylactic rules was a necessary response to this state
threat to fundamental liberties. In stark contrast, in the RFRA, Congress did
little more than hold hearings excoriating our interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause in Smith, with barely a perfunctory effort to develop a
supportive record of alleged state misconduct. Under such circumstances, we
cannot in good conscience afford our usual deference to congressional
293. See note 269 supra.
294. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
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judgments; such deference is premised on the assumption (not satisfied here)
that Congress acts as an equal partner in respecting the limits on its own
constitutional authority. 295
If this captures the Court's attitude (whether or not it accurately reflects
recent history296), then the generative effect of Boerne's heightened means-ends
tailoring requirement on Article I or other Enforcement Clause powers might
turn, not so much on whether the particular rationale(s) underlying Boerne
logically entail a broader application, but more on whether the Court's apparent
assumption of congressional neglect of its own constitutional duties remains
constant over time. Not surprisingly, then, one central lesson for Congress
emerging from this line of cases, as well as from Lopez and its progeny in the
Commerce Clause context, is that Congress should be more careful and
thorough when laying the groundwork for expansive applications of legislative
authority. The more the Court comes to respect Congress' own self-policing
and diligence in creating a proper record, the more the Court is likely to relax
its recent insistence on rigorous means-ends review z97
But whatever the ultimate impact of Boerne on other legislative powers, its
impact on Section 5 authority is immediate, stark, and unfortunate. While
purporting to protect "vital principles necessary to maintain separation of
powers and the federal balance,"298 the Court has failed to explain why those
principles dictate retrenchment from the venerable axiom that Congress is the
proper arbiter of the reasonableness of legislation plainly adapted to achieve
legitimate constitutional ends. Rather, Boerne ultimately disserves core
federalism principles by precluding Congress from exercising its intended role
in securing the promises of the Fourteenth Amendment by supplementing
judicial constraints on state misconduct.
295. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) ("Judicial deference, in
most cases, is based... 'on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally
appointed to decide."') (citation omitted).
296. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda? 85 CORNELL
L. REv. 883, 887-906 (2000) (detailing how Congress' passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3501
purporting to overrule Miranda reflected antagonism toward the Court's perceived soft-on-
crime status without careful and deliberative consideration of either Fifth Amendment values
or the limits of congressional authority to withdraw judicial protection thereof).
297. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574
ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 145, 150-53 (2001) (assessing the implications of the
Court's recent federalism decisions for Congress' "care and craft" in enacting legislation).
298. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
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